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ABSTRACT 
THE PACIFIC WAR CRIMES TRIALS: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE "SMALL 
FRY" VS. THE "BIG FISH" 
Lisa Kelly Pennington 
Old Dominion University, 2012 
Director: Dr. Maura Hametz 
In the post-World War II era, the Allied nations faced multiple issues, from 
occupying the Axis countries and rebuilding Europe and Japan to trying war criminals for 
atrocities committed prior to and during the war. War crimes trials were an important 
part of the occupation process and by conducting the trials, the Allied nations hoped not 
only to punish war criminals, but to provide examples of democratic principles to the 
former Axis powers and deter future wartime atrocities. When considering war crimes 
trials, it is most often Nuremberg that comes to mind, and it is Nuremberg that has 
dominated much of written history since the trials took place. However, the Pacific saw 
over 2,000 war crimes trials and over 5,000 defendants, divided into Class A and Class 
BC categories, with trials conducted by several Allied nations. In the Pacific arena, the 
Class BC suspects were considered "small fiy" compared to the "big fish" suspects such 
as Hideki Tojo who were tried as Class A criminals in Tokyo. 
The Allies' goals in the Pacific were to punish war criminals and instill 
democratic principles in Japan. Given the realities of the post-war period and the 
differences between the trials, did the Tokyo Trial and the Class BC trials held by the 
United States at Yokohama accomplish what they intended? This study argues that the 
Class BC trials at Yokohama were more successful in accomplishing the goals of the 
United States in the post-war era, and played the more important role in global politics. 
The Tokyo Trial, while more widely known, was primarily a show trial designed to 
symbolize the end of a militaristic Japan, and instead of punishing war criminals the 
countries involved pursued their own private political agendas. 
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The end of World War II left the Allies with a long list of tasks to accomplish to 
help the world recover from a brutal and far reaching war. The war resulted not only in 
the destruction of large parts of Europe and Asia, but it also saw wartime atrocities never 
before imagined. These atrocities could not be ignored, and in addition to rebuilding 
Europe and the Pacific, the Allies were determined to conduct trials to hold responsible 
those who committed war crimes. 
The Allies conducted trials in both Europe and the Pacific. Nuremberg and the 
horrific stories about the Holocaust captured the world's attention. The trials in the 
Pacific received scant attention compared to those in Nuremberg. Even the trial of the 
major war criminals held at Tokyo, including Hideki Tojo, the former Minister of War, 
was virtually ignored. 
After the trials Nuremberg remained the focal point and it has dominated much of 
written history about post war trials. Often, the only Pacific trial remembered is the 
Tokyo Trial, generally considered the only important trial that occurred in the Pacific. 
Solis Horwitz, an American prosecutor during the trial, described the Tokyo Trial "one of 
the most important trials in world history" due to its "outstanding example of concerted 
actions by eleven nations representing more than one-half of the peoples in the world" 
and its significance "to all who are concerned with the elimination of war as a means of 
settling international differences and with the establishment of a system of world peace 
and order under law."1 The President of the Tokyo Tribunal Sir William Webb declared 
1 Solis Horwitz, "The Tokyo Trial," International Conciliation no. 457 (January 1950): 475. 
2 
shortly after the tribunal convened, "there has been no more important criminal trial in all 
history."2 
The Allies divided war crimes into three classes. Class A crimes, or crimes 
against peace, constituted the "planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a declared 
or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, 
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing." Class B crimes, or conventional war crimes, 
concerned the violations of the rules or customs of warfare. Class C crimes, considered 
crimes against humanity, were defined as "murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before 
or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in 
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated."3 In the Pacific between 
1946 and 1949 Class B and Class C trials predominated. 
The purpose of dividing war crimes trials into three classes was to punish those 
who committed war time atrocities according to the severity of their crimes. Crimes 
against peace were considered the most serious. Behind the scenes several other factors 
and goals of the Allied nations influenced the trials, which developed in different ways. 
By the time the trials concluded, the Class A and Class BC trials had accomplished 
different things. The Tokyo Trial had served as an education tool and the representative 
end to an era of Japanese militarism and ushered in a new and, more importantly, 
2 R. John Pritchard, "An Overview of the Historical Importance of the Tokyo War Trial," Nissan 
Occasional Paper Series No. 5, 1987. 
3 CINCAFPAC ADV, CINCAFPAC, from Washington, 22 September 1945. MacArthur Memorial 
Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "12 September 1945-21 June 1946." 
3 
democratic period for Japan. The Class BC trials at Yokohama punished war criminals in 
the manner stated in the Potsdam Declaration and also proved more useful in the global 
political arena than the Class A trial. 
The Class BC trials were not considered important, even as they were taking 
place. Class BC criminals were "small fry" according to a memo of 12 November 1945, 
which pushed for prompt conclusion of the trials after they had already begun. The 
United States wanted a rapid first conviction, whether it was of General Yamashita in the 
Philippines or of another "small fry" defendant.4 At the outset, the United States was in a 
hurry to begin punishing war criminals. This quickly changed as tensions arose between 
the United States and Soviet Union. In contrast, Class A war criminals tried in Tokyo 
were considered the "big fish," responsible for planning an aggressive war. The purpose 
of this study is to show that the forgotten BC trials accomplished what they set out to do. 
They were also used as a tool by the United States in their mission to turn Japan into an 
ally against Communism in East Asia. 
The legacy of the Tokyo Trial is steeped in controversy. Often viewed as a show 
trial riddled with procedural flaws that resulted in victor's justice for the Allied nations, it 
was touted as an important and fair trial of Japan's wartime leaders. Issues raised by the 
defense and even some of the judges questioned the validity of their jurisdiction at the 
conclusion of court proceedings. The first published work on the Tokyo Trial written in 
1950 by American prosecutor Solis Horwitz, presents the general background to and 
description of the trial. Though Horwitz supported the trial and its accomplishments, he 
4 CINCAFPAC (for Whitlock) from CINCAFPAC ADV Marshall, 12 November 1945. MacArthur 
Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "12 September 1945-21 June 1946." 
4 
alluded not only to the fact that other opinions of the trial might arise but also to the 
tensions that emerged between the United States and Soviet Union: 
Amidst the tensions of the new post-war conflicts the members of the Tribunal might 
have succumbed to a feeling that their task was a futile one. It is of the utmost 
significance that they did not succumb, but, even under the impact of events which might 
foreshadow a conflict more horrible than the one just concluded, they elected to reaffirm 
as an act of faith, their conviction that war was not a necessary concomitant of 
international life and that acknowledged principles of law and justice were fully 
applicable to nations and their leaders. Whatever may be the ultimate decision on the 
merits of this judgment, perhaps the real significance of the work of the Tokyo Tribunal 
lies in this act of faith.5 
Aside from Horwitz's description of the trial, the trial record, and sources that 
focused on the international law aspect published soon after the trial's conclusion, the 
first work to critically examine the Tokyo Trial was not published until 1971. Richard 
Minear's Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial relied heavily on the record of 
the trial proceedings as well as a few secondary works that briefly mentioned the trial but 
did not go into detail. Minear used Japanese language sources in his work and bluntly 
stated in his preface that his task was "to demolish the credibility of the Tokyo Trial and 
its verdict."6 He then proceeded to attack all aspects of the trial, from the Charter to the 
judgment. As a work of political scholarship, he focused on international law and the 
legal conflicts that arose during the trial, many of which were genuine concerns brought 
up before the tribunal. However, the angry tone of his work detracts from the important 
questions he raised. Minear, heavily influenced by the Vietnam War, hoped that "an 
awareness of the absurdities and the inequities of the Tokyo Trial will help us to rethink 
some of our assumptions about American policy in Asia, about Japan, and about 
5 Horwitz, "The Tokyo Trial," 575 (italics added). 
6 Richard H. Minear, Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1971), ix. 
5 
Indochina."7 The text is an easy read, especially given the technical international law 
Minear deals with, but it is difficult to separate his judgment from the concerns he raises 
about the legal legitimacy of the Tokyo Trial. 
The next major work to focus on the Tokyo Trial, published in 1987 by Arnold C. 
Brackman, a United Press staff correspondent who covered the Tokyo Trial, detailed all 
aspects of the trial. Present for most of the trial, Brackman saved the transcripts 
presented to the press of each day's testimony. Aside from the transcripts, Brackman 
relied on the material in his own files from his time in Japan, news stories, official court 
records, and interviews with participants. Brackman offers an in-depth look at the Tokyo 
Trial that presents the problems that arose during the trial. His text is not intended as 
historical analysis but as a journalistic accounting of the trial. He succeeds in presenting 
a thorough explanation of the court proceedings, the key people involved, and the issues. 
In the 1980s, as trial records became declassified, historians began to reconsider 
the legacy of the Tokyo Trial. In 2001, Timothy Maga argued that the Tokyo Trial had 
• ft 
good intentions and "might even have done good work.' Maga was criticized for failure 
to appropriately analyze and an apparent attempt to cover too many topics in too short a 
work. Maga introduced some of the lesser trials, specifically those held by the United 
States on Guam and ended his text by tying the Tokyo Trial's legacy to the creation of a 
permanent international tribunal to try war criminals. Maga raised an interesting point of 
view on the trials but a more narrow focus or a longer text would have allowed for a more 
thorough review. 
7 Minear, Victor's Justice, xiv. 
8 Timothy Maga, Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2001), ix. 
6 
Yuma Totani in 2008 also challenged the negative view of the Tokyo Trial and 
provided a bibliography detailing the extensive archival and primary resources used in 
the text as well as a plethora of secondary sources. A Japanese historian trained in the 
United States, Totani's sources are both English and Japanese, allowing him to offer the 
Japanese perspective on the trials usually lacking in English language works. Perhaps 
most helpful is Totani's discussion of the analysis of the Tokyo Trial, beginning with the 
positive view taken by the first trial analysts who often saw the trial as a success, to the 
idea the trial was victor's justice and finally the slowly evolving opinion that the trial was 
not simply designed for revenge as more records are declassified and made available to 
historians. Totani seems to agree with Awaya Kentaro who argued that the trial "was 
neither a revenge trial nor a just trial, but one that fell somewhere in between."9 This 
stance does not really further the argument that the trial was a positive force, nor 
completely refute the argument that the trial was victor's justice, but the work offers 
evidence for both points of view. 
Three English language memoirs by or about the Tokyo defendants exist. Two 
are by Class A criminals who were arrested and held at Sugamo Prison, but never tried. 
Both are titled Sugamo Diary and offer clues about the life of the suspects of all classes 
of war crimes held at Sugamo. Yoshio Kodama's memoir is more positive about the 
United States than Ryoichi Sasakawa's, but both authors to some extent disagree with the 
trials.10 Kodama did not feel the trials would accomplish their goals, while Sasakawa 
believed the United States should focus instead on communism and hoped to use his 
9 Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), 247-248. 
10 Yoshio Kodama, Sugamo Diary (Tokyo: Radiopress, 1960) and Ryoichi Sasakawa, Sugamo Diary (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 
7 
position as a Class A suspect to defend Japan and educate the world on the events that led 
Japan to act aggressively. Sasakawa's memoir clearly has an agenda, but even Kodama's 
work must be critically examined given his position as a suspected war criminal facing 
the possibility of a trial. 
Shinsho Hanayaman's memoir, The Way of Deliverance: Three Years with the 
Condemned Japanese War Criminals offers a different perspective.11 Hanayaman was 
the Buddhist priest who administered to the prisoners at Sugamo. His work centered on 
his interactions with the suspected war criminals, particularly those who were condemned 
to death, including the seven major war criminals from the Tokyo Trial. Hanayaman 
tried to refrain from politics and focus instead on the spiritual experiences and lives of the 
men in prison. Since Hanayaman was often the last person to interact with the 
condemned men prior to their execution, he was able to relay their final messages and 
actions, which is a unique perspective in the literature that generally focuses only on the 
wrongdoings committed. Hanayaman did not go so far as to apologize for the war 
criminals, but often speaks highly and respectfully of them. 
In addition to these major texts, various articles and portions of monographs focus 
on the Tokyo Trial. The topics vary widely and cover ideas from aspects of international 
law, the controversies, the defendants, and the dissents produced by several of the 
justices. Few works however focus solely on the Tokyo Trial like Minear and Brackman. 
Many seek to place the trial in the context of World War II or the emerging Cold War. 
For the most part, the trial is still viewed negatively, though Totani suggests that new 
scholars will soon challenge that view. 
11 Shinsho Hanayaman, The Way of Deliverance: Three Years with the Condemned Japanese War 
Criminals (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950). 
In contrast, little has been published on the Class BC trials. In 1979 Philip 
Piccigallo published a study entitled The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes 
Operations in the East, 1945-1951. Piccigallo's study was the first English language text 
to deal with the Class BC trials. After a chapter devoted to the Tokyo Trial, the text 
served as an overview to the many lesser trials conducted in the Pacific by the various 
Allied nations. Piccigallo's work is organized by Allied country and in an effort to 
present a balanced view on each nation that conducted trials, each chapter offers 
information on the procedure and machinery used to conduct the trials, as well as the 
trials themselves and the outcome. Piccigallo relied heavily on governmental records 
regarding court proceedings and generally argues that the lesser trials were fair and 
effective in punishing Japanese war criminals, a task he deemed necessary. He was 
straightforward in his intent and stated his work was focused on operational aspects of the 
trials. Piccigallo hoped to inspire further inquiry into the trails, and to "rescue lesser 
Japanese trials from historical oblivion."12 His work was generally well received, and his 
main contribution was the introduction of the lesser trials to the attention of a wider 
audience.13 He cites a need for additional research into that area and accomplishes his 
goal of offering an overview of the procedure of the lesser trials. 
John L. Ginn, an American stationed at Sugamo Prison in 1948, published a work 
in 1992 that focused on Sugamo, and the trial and sentencing of war criminals of all three 
classes. Like Piccigallo's work, Ginn's provides an overview of the trials. He detailed 
select Class BC cases and provided a listing of all the Class BC trials at Yokohama as 
12 Philip R. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945-1951 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), xiii-xiv. 
13 Mark R. Peattie, Review of The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945-
1951, by Philip R. Piccigallo. American Historical Review 86 no. 3(June 1981): 639-640. 
9 
well as the verdicts and sentences of the defendants. The driving force behind his text 
however, is the prison itself and the Americans who served there. Ginn offers a look at 
how Sugamo Prison functioned and the lives of the American soldiers stationed there. 
He also provides background information on the war crimes trials, but the text is a 
memoir and does not analyze the importance of the trials. The text is useful for 
background reading and for the list of the outcomes of the Class BC trials at Yokohama 
however. 
Recent scholarship has highlighted the importance of the Class BC criminals. 
Sandra Wilson's study of the Class BC criminals and their campaign for release after the 
trials concluded sheds light on these lesser known criminals and their political activity 
while serving their prison sentences.14 The Class BC prisoners were widely supported in 
Japan after the war and the public was very much involved in the fight for their release. 
While Wilson's work does not focus on the trials themselves, she offers a unique 
perspective on the lives of the "small fry" and their importance, and demonstrates how 
Japan did not forget these men after the peace treaty was signed and Japan regained its 
sovereignty. Wilson makes use of Japanese language sources, which allow her to present 
the Japanese view on the condemned men and counter the American view on the release 
of war criminals. 
Overall, English language sources on the Japanese war crimes trials are limited. 
A few memoirs by Japanese participants were published, though they are memoirs of 
Class A prisoners. Currently no English translations of memoirs by Class BC prisoners 
exist. Government documents, including the trial records, are plentiful but offer only 
14 Sandra Wilson, "Prisoners in Sugamo and Their Campaign for Release," Japanese Studies 31 no. 2 
(2011): 171-190 
10 
American perspectives on the trials. The Class A trial record does include the dissenting 
opinions of several justices, but unlike the Nuremberg Trial, the Tokyo proceedings were 
not widely published and distributed. The dissenting opinions however do offer 
perspectives on the trial from other Allied countries and provide support for those critical 
of the trial. The Class A trial record has been examined, most extensively by R. John 
Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide who compiled the court proceedings into a 22 
volume set. No compilation or extensive study of the Class BC trial records exists. 
Piccigallo stated, "such an attempt, although ultimately needed, would demand Herculean 
effort—certainly exceeding the capabilities of one individual—and must therefore await 
the combined labor of future scholars."15 The United States alone conducted over 400 
Class BC trials, resulting in a massive number of records. 
The University of California at Berkeley offers the Judge Advocate General 
Review synopses of 160 Yokohama trials through its War Crimes Study Center. The 
Center holds microfilm copies of the trial records from the National Archives, and 
provides the only online access to the information contained in the records. The entire 
trial record is not reproduced online. The information provides the defendant's name, 
charges and specifications, and the verdicts and sentences. In addition, comments from 
the reviewing authority are included as well as a very brief description of the arguments 
of the prosecution and defense. The project is far from complete, and each case 
presented on the website does not contain all the relevant information. The synopses do 
offer a starting point for the Yokohama trials and may be used to choose specific trials for 
further research, though only approximately half of the trials have synopses. 
15 Piccigallo, The Japanese on Tried, xiii-xiv. 
11 
The Class BC trials were just as large an undertaking as the Class A trial, if not 
larger. The Class BC trials involved more defendants and required more time than the 
Class A trial. With constantly changing military commissions, the lesser trials were 
forced to carefully consider procedure in order to ensure each defendant received a fair 
trial. Perhaps because they lacked the prestige and limelight of the Class A trial, the 
Class BC trials were able to focus on punishing Japan's war criminals and prove useful as 
a bargaining chip in the post-war era. 
12 
CHAPTER II 
CLASS A WAR CRIMES TRIAL: TOKYO 
The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 set the goal of the war crimes trials in 
the Pacific theater. The United States, Great Britain, and the Republic of China stated 
that while they did not intend to enslave the Japanese or destroy them as a race, "stern 
justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties 
upon our prisoners."1 The Potsdam Declaration also called for the Japanese government 
to remove all obstacles to the establishment of democratic principles among the Japanese 
people.2 The war crimes trials offered the Allies an opportunity to model democratic 
principles for the Japanese, and demonstrate the process of fair trials.3 
With the goals of punishing war criminals and turning Japan into a democracy in 
mind, the Allied nations set up individual commissions to prosecute Class BC criminals, 
and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) to try the Class A 
suspects. 
The Tokyo Trial was steeped in controversy, and it is often denounced as a show 
trial and an example of "victor's" justice since the judges appointed to the Tribunal all 
represented victor nations. The defense challenged the court, stating that the tribunal 
members represented the accusers and were therefore unable to be impartial.4 This is 
only one of the many problems that would arise as the United States sought to assert itself 
in its newfound superpower role in the aftermath of the war. 
1 Potsdam Declaration, July 26, 1945, Article 10. 
2 Potsdam Declaration, Article 10. 
3 Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 7. 
4Minear, Victor's Justice, 77. 
13 
As the trial progressed and stretched far past the six months initially allotted for 
the court proceedings, it was clear that the United States had concerns other than the 
punishment of Japan's major war criminals. Ultimately, the trial served more as the 
finale to the war in the Pacific theater and ushered in a new era as the United States 
followed its own separate agenda. Japan's major war criminals were sentenced, but even 
some of the tribunal members questioned the validity of their jurisdiction and ability to 
impose punishment on the twenty-five men who would sit in the dock in Tokyo. 
ESTABLISHING THE IMTFE: EARLY CONFLICTS 
Several documents led to the establishment of the IMTFE in January 1946. In 
addition to the Potsdam Declaration, the Cairo Declaration and the Instrument of 
Surrender contributed to the IMTFE's creation. The Cairo Declaration, signed by the 
United States, the Republic of China, and Great Britain on 1 December 1943 was an 
agreement between the Allies to "restrain and punish the aggression of Japan."5 The 
Declaration described the Allies' intention to return all the territory Japan occupied 
during the war, and their desire for an unconditional surrender.6 On 2 September 1945, 
representatives for Emperor Hirohito and the Japanese government signed the Instrument 
of Surrender, placing all Japanese armed forces under Allied control. The Instrument of 
Surrender guaranteed that the conditions of the Potsdam Declaration, including war 
5 International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment (Tokyo, November 1948), Part A, 2. 
6 IMTFE, Judgment, Part A, 2-3. 
crimes trials, would be carried out as ordered by the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers (SCAP.)7 
After the surrender, the United States occupied Japan. A law making body for the 
Occupation, the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), was founded in December 1945. The 
FEC's purpose was to "formulate the policies, principles, and standards" for the Japanese 
surrender and subsequent Occupation by Allied forces. At the Moscow Conference on 26 
December 1945, the United States, Great Britain, the USSR and the Republic of China 
agreed that the Supreme Commander had the power to "issue all orders for the 
implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan and 
directives supplementary hereto."8 President Truman designated General Douglas 
MacArthur as Supreme Commander.9 Truman wanted MacArthur to have "complete 
command and control" in Japan. The United States assured its Allies of a cooperative 
effort in the Occupation, but stated where disagreements arose, "the policies of the 
United States will govern."10 
Overseeing the war crimes trials was one of General MacArthur's responsibilities 
as SCAP. Washington urged MacArthur to begin preparing for war crimes trials soon 
after the Instrument of Surrender was signed, and the Class BC trials began fairly 
quickly. The Class A trial took much longer to organize. MacArthur did not approve the 
IMTFE Charter and officially establish the Tribunal until 19 January 1946. The conflicts 
over the role of the IMTFE that arose early in the Occupation indicated that the United 
7 IMTFE, Judgment, Instrument of Surrender, 4-5. 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured documents/iapanese surrender document (accessed 22 
September 2011). 
8 IMTFE, Judgment, 5. 
9 MacArthur, as the Commander in Chief of the Far East Command was already in control of all American 
military forces in the Pacific, and was in charge after the surrender of Japan. The Moscow Conference, 
with the agreement of the eleven Allied nations, made MacArthur's role as SCAP official. 
10 Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 6. 
15 
States was more concerned with appearances and a successful Occupation than with the 
punishment of war criminals. 
In early October 1945, MacArthur requested permission of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to proceed with a Class A trial of Hideki Tojo for the bombing of Pearl Harbor.11 
A second memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 October 1945 reiterated his request. 
MacArthur also asked that the commission for such a trial be composed solely of United 
States personnel, as the attack on Pearl Harbor affected only United States citizens.12 
"Any criminal responsibility attached to Japanese political leaders for the decision to 
wage war should be limited to an indictment for the attack on Pearl Harbor, since this act 
was effected without a prior declaration of war as required by international law and 
custom," he argued.13 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed. On two separate occasions in November 
1945 Washington sent MacArthur directives stating that Tojo and other major war 
criminals would be tried by an International Tribunal. Creating an International Tribunal 
assisted the United States in maintaining its policy of allowing other Allied nations to 
have input in the Occupation process. A memo on 11 November 1945 informed 
MacArthur that the United States had already requested that Allied signatories of the 
Instrument of Surrender nominate personnel for an International Tribunal.14 This 
11 WARCOS from CINCAFPAC ADV, 7 October 1945. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Record Group 9, 
Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 June 1946." 
12 WARCOS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) from CINCAFPAC ADV, 31 October 1945. MacArthur Memorial 
Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 21 September 1945-21 June 
1946." 
13 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1964), 318. 
14 CINCAFPAC ADV, CINCAFPAC from Washington, 4 November 1945. MacArthur Memorial 
Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 June 
1946" and CINCAFPAC ADVANCE, CINCAFPAC Manila (MacArthur), 11 November 1945. MacArthur 
Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 
June 1946." 
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decision also demonstrated United States' cooperation with its Allies in the matter of war 
crimes trials, and MacArthur was forced to abandon his objections. 
Not only did Washington disagree with MacArthur on occasion, it did not always 
agree with its Allies. Washington took advantage of its position to impose its will where 
disagreements arose. The most prominent example of this policy concerned Emperor 
Hirohito. The United States was not opposed to trying Hirohito as a war criminal but was 
not willing to raise the question of his trial until it was proven that the Occupation could 
proceed without him.15 Therefore, the United States ordered MacArthur to collect 
evidence but to take no action against the Emperor.16 MacArthur believed that Hirohito 
should not be tried. A 2 October 1945 memo to MacArthur from his Military Secretary, 
Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers, detailed several reasons for not trying Hirohito as a 
war criminal. Fellers described Hirohito as the "incarnation of national spirit, incapable 
of wrong or misdeeds," and stated that "to try him as a war criminal would not only be 
blasphemous but a denial of spiritual freedom."17 The Occupation also required the 
services of the Emperor. On his order the military laid down its arms. Trying Hirohito as 
a war criminal would cause Japan's government to collapse and might result in an 
uprising requiring a larger expeditionary force and prolonging the occupation. Most 
tellingly, Fellers concluded, "American long range interests require friendly relations 
with the Orient based on mutual respect, faith and understanding. In the long run it is of 
15 CINCAFPAC ADV, CINCAFPAC from Washington (Joint Chiefs of Staff), 30 November 1945. 
MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 
September 1945-21 June 1946." 
16 CINCAFPAC ADV, CINCAFPAC from Washington, 22 September 1945. MacArthur Memorial 
Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 June 
1946." 
17 Memorandum to the Commander in Chief, 2 October 1945. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, 
VA, Record Group 5, Box 2, Folder 2, 
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paramount, national importance that Japan harbor no lasting resentment."18 This 
statement suggests that the United States was more concerned with Occupation than the 
punishment of war criminals and also suggests the United States counted on Emperor 
Hirohito to ensure that the Occupation ran smoothly. It indicated the United States' 
desire to contain communism was prominent very shortly after the conclusion of the war. 
Japan's possible involvement in containment, though perhaps not the extent, was also 
recognized. A memo from 8 October 1945 also shows that the United States was very 
concerned with a smooth Occupation. Early arrest of former high officials was deemed 
advantageous to the United States, not for the purpose of punishing them as war 
criminals, but to allow those who were not arrested to "attain a peace of mind to enable 
them to devote their abilities, such as they may be, to the task of reforming and 
rehabilitating the government in this country." Once officials realized arrests were 
complete and they no long had anything to fear, they could focus on the business at 
hand.19 
MacArthur argued that Hirohito's role was largely ministerial, and that to place 
the Emperor on trial would destroy the nation.20 MacArthur argued along the lines 
proposed by Fellers, and due to his recommendation, Washington decided not to try 
Hirohito. Other Allied countries, including Australia, objected. The Australians' list of 
21 
major war criminals contained 61 names, including that of Hirohito. 
18 Memorandum to the Commander in Chief, 2 October 1945. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, 
VA, Record Group 5, Box 2, Folder 2. 
19 Memorandum for Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff from George Atcheson, Jr., 8 October 1945. 
MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 30, Box 8, Folder 8. 
20 WARCOS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) from CINCAFPAC ADV (MacArthur), 24 January 1946. MacArthur 
Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 
June 1946." 
21 CINCAFPAC, CINCAFPAC ADV (For MacArthur) from Washington (Joint Chiefs of Staff), 22 January 
1946. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 
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The majority of the Japanese public appeared to agree with MacArthur. Between 
November 1945 and January 1946, MacArthur received over 160 letters from the public 
asking him to protect the emperor and preserve the imperial system.22 In many of the 
letters, the writer's immediate concern was whether or not Hirohito would be tried as a 
war criminal. In a study of the letters, Sodei Rinjiro states that 80 letters appear to have 
been written in an organized effort to petition for the emperor's protection, as they all 
come from the same prefecture and contain similar content. The 80 letters, in wording 
that is very similar, stated, "You must not put the emperor on trial. Please, absolutely, do 
not put the emperor on trial."23 Longer letters addressed to MacArthur contained similar 
sentiments. It is not known for certain if these letters influenced MacArthur in his 
decision to protect the emperor, or if they only cemented his commitment to keep 
Hirohito out of the courtroom. Their existence supports MacArthur's assertion that 
trying Hirohito as a war criminal could have detrimental effects on the population and 
possibly create anti-American sentiment in Japan. 
The Republic of the Philippines also wanted Hirohito to be tried as a war 
criminal. The national executive of the Philippines Lawyers Guild, J. Antonio Araneta, a 
longtime friend of MacArthur, cited Japanese law to prove that Hirohito was the head of 
state, and as such, only he had the ability to initiate war. Araneta was convinced that 
trying the Emperor would aid MacArthur in the Occupation and allow Japan to move 
toward democracy. MacArthur was not swayed. Araneta appealed directly to President 
September 1945-21 June 1946," and CINCAFPAC (MacArthur) from Washington (Joint Chiefs of Staff), 
22 January 1946, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 
"Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 June 1946." 
22 Sodei Rinjiro, Dear General MacArthur (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 63-67. 
23 Rinjiro, Dear General MacArthur, 68. 
Truman, who continued to back MacArthur's decision.24 This tenacity suggests that the 
United States was more concerned with overseeing a stable occupation than with 
punishing war criminals or appeasing allies. 
The United States was not the only party interested in protecting the Emperor. 
The defendants also worked to keep Hirohito's name out of the trial. Although they did 
not work to clear his name for the same reasons, Hideki Tojo and Chief Prosecutor 
Joseph B. Keenan worked together at one point to clarify Tojo's statements that appeared 
to implicate Hirohito. Keenan supported MacArthur's decision against trying Hirohito. 
If Hirohito were labeled a criminal, the newfound cooperation between the United States 
and Japan would weaken and perhaps turn into anti-American sentiment.25 Tojo, on the 
other hand, worked to protect Hirohito because of his reverence for his Emperor. Under 
cross examination by Keenan, Tojo at one point remarked that Hirohito had consented, 
albeit reluctantly to war. He added that no one dared to act against the Emperor's will, 
suggesting that had the Emperor so chosen, he could have stopped the war. This seemed 
to indicate Hirohito's guilt. Keenan and Tojo both realized the gravity of the situation, 
and Keenan secretly appealed to Tojo through Marquis Kido to clarify his statement at 
the next opportunity, even if the clarification was detrimental to himself. A week after 
his initial statements, Tojo, again under cross examination by Keenan, stated that war was 
decided on in his cabinet, and on his advice and the advice of the high command, the 
Emperor reluctantly consented to war. Tojo went on to say that the Emperor harbored 
love and desire for peace, even during the war, and that Hirohito's declaration of war on 
8 December 1941 contained the sentiment that "this war is indeed unavoidable and is 
24 Maga, Judgment at Tokyo, 38-39. 
25 Maga, Judgment at Tokyo, 35-36. 
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against my own desires." Assuming responsibility for the trial was not just a sentiment 
Tojo expressed in the courtroom. He made the same statements to Yoshio Kodama, 
another Class A suspect housed at Sugamo Prison who was released before being brought 
to trial. Kodama recorded a conversation with Tojo in his prison diary in which Tojo 
stated "if a man's life expectancy is 50 years, then I have had 10 extra years. It will make 
no difference as far as my own fate is concerned whether I take responsibility for one 
thing or for everything. I shall therefore take the responsibility of as many things as I 
can. In any case, it is I who am responsible for the Pacific War."27 Kodama's diary entry 
does not offer clues to whether the confession was a sincere claim or simply a continuing 
expression of his loyalty to the emperor, or a combination of the two. 
Hirohito remained on the throne. The outcome of the situation proved that the 
United States was firmly in charge and in this instance using its authority as the leader of 
the Occupation to direct the outcome of the trial and pursue its own agenda. The show of 
power was important for the United States given rapidly increasing tensions with the 
Soviet Union. Assuming the leadership role and taking a strong stance during the Tokyo 
Trial let the remaining Allied countries know that the United States occupied a position 
of such power that it did not have to bend to the will of their Allies in the post war world 
but was strong enough to dictate how the recovery of Japan should progress. 
THE IMTFE CHARTER: ORGANIZATION 
Mac Arthur received a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on 12 
September 1945 expressing President Truman's desire to "proceed, without avoidable 
26 Arnold C. Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial (New 
York: Quill, 1987), 353-355. 
27 Kodama, Sugamo Diary, 66-68. 
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delay, with the trial before appropriate Military Courts or Tribunals and the punishment 
of such Japanese War Criminals as have been or may be apprehended."28 In reality, 
organizing the tribunal and appointing its members was a long and drawn out process and 
eight months would pass before the Class A trial of high ranking Japanese officials at 
Tokyo began. In the months between the 12 September memo and the convening of the 
Class A trial on 3 May 1946, MacArthur appointed members to the tribunal, set the 
guidelines for the trial, and prepared for its start. 
MacArthur officially established the IMTFE on 19 January 1946 for "the trial of 
those persons charged individually or as members of organizations or in both capacities 
with offences which include crimes against peace."29 On the same date he approved the 
Charter for the IMTFE which outlined the jurisdiction and general provisions of the 
tribunal, defined the right of the accused to a fair trial, detailed the powers of the tribunal, 
the process of the trial, and the right of the tribunal to pass judgment and sentences upon 
the defendants. The Charter determined the basic organization of the Tribunal, allowing 
for representatives from the United States, Great Britain, France, China, Australia, New 
Zealand, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, and Canada.30 
One of the members of the Tribunal would serve as President and act as 
moderator during the proceedings.31 The US State Department requested designees from 
the Allied countries for possible appointment to the tribunal. The designees were to be 
28 JCS to Douglas MacArthur, 12 September 1945. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record 
Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 June 1946." 
29 Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan, Part II: Allied Authority, 1. MacArthur Memorial Archives, 
Norfolk, VA. Politics ofJapan September 1945-September 1948. Report of Government Section, SCAP: 
423-427. Crimes against peace were considered the most serious war crime in the post war era. Only those 
charged with Class A crimes were considered to be major war criminals. 
30 SCAP, Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo: SCAP, 1946), Article 1, 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/govabov/hist250/assets/pdfs/imtfe.pdf (accessed 19 September 2011). 
31 SCAP, Charter, Article 3a. 
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military officers or qualified civilians, preferably with the ability to speak English. The 
Soviet Union did not adhere to this request, and sent a justice who did not speak English, 
perhaps to defy the United States and challenge its leading role during the trial. 
MacArthur appointed judges to the tribunal from the designees.32 Only six members of 
the Tribunal were required to be present to convene court proceedings, and a majority 
vote by members present was necessary in order to make decisions, including convictions 
and sentences. A tie vote would be decided by the President of the Tribunal.33 Unlike 
Nuremberg, no alternates were provided to the judges in case of absence, and any judge 
who missed court sessions continued to be able to participate in later proceedings unless 
he declared himself unfit in open court.34 Several judges were absent for lengthy periods 
during the trial including the Tribunal President, though none ever declared himself unfit 
to continue with court proceedings. Each judge was responsible for familiarizing himself 
with the testimony given during his absence. A judge's absence could be a disadvantage 
to the defendants if the judge missed key testimony, but given the number of justices on 
the bench at Tokyo it was not practical to house 11 additional alternate justices. Timothy 
Maga stated the "strange" rule reflected the expectation of a fast moving trial. The 
defense opposed the rule, as a rapid trial was not in the best interests of its clients. The 
tribunal ignored the objection, which became moot since the trial proceeded so slowly 
that it was possible an absent justice would not miss a great deal of testimony. 
32 Washington to General Headquarters Tokyo & General Headquarters, 25 October 1945. MacArthur 
Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 
June 1946." 
33 SCAP, Charter, Article 4ab. 
34 SCAP, Charter, Article 4c. The Charter offers no further information on absent judges, and does not 
allow for the defense to object if a judge missed a considerable length of time. The decision to withdraw 
from the bench was left entirely to the justice. 
35 Maga, Judgement at Tokyo, 43. 
The Charter allowed for SCAP to appoint a Chief of Counsel, and any nation with 
which Japan was at war was able to appoint Associate Counsels to assist the Chief. 
This stipulation supported the argument that the tribunal was biased, since it was 
composed only of enemy and victim nations. Article 9 addressed the right to a fair trial 
for the accused. It required each defendant receive a copy of the indictment in a language 
he understood in time to allow for an adequate defense. It also mandated English and 
Japanese as the official languages of the trial proceedings, and allowed for translations of 
documents as needed or requested. It was important that each defendant understood the 
court proceedings and the charges against him. Guaranteeing the defendants trial 
proceedings in their native language showed that the court was committed to carrying out 
fair justice for the accused and was not simply rushing through the trial in order to exact 
punishment, and demonstrated that democratic ideals trumped the desire for revenge. It 
also allowed the defendant to prepare the best possible defense when he understood all 
aspects of the court proceedings. The court remained committed to this right even though 
translation difficulties between English and Japanese led to problems and often slowed 
court proceedings while interpreters struggled to appropriately translate between the two 
languages. By adhering to the rule throughout the trial, the Allies demonstrated 
commitment to the rights of the defendants in a court of law. 
Each defendant had the right to select his own defense counsel, and if he chose 
not to exercise that right the tribunal could appoint his counsel. Adequate defense 
counsel was an important idea in western jurisprudence and by ensuring the defendant 
proper representation the Tokyo Trial would be viewed as treating the accused fairly and 
36 SCAP, Charter, Article 8ab. By granting SCAP the authority to appoint the Chief of Counsel, this 
responsibility was directly given to the Americans and ensured that the United States had control over this 
role. 
allowing him the best possible opportunity to present his case. The accused also had the 
right to request witnesses or documents to aid in his defense, another example of 
allowing the defendant ample opportunity to present his argument. The defendant had to 
submit a written application to the tribunal explaining where the evidence requested was 
located, as well as how the evidence was relevant to the defense. If the tribunal approved 
the application, it would provide assistance in obtaining it. Assistance in obtaining 
evidence should have signaled fair treatment, although this was not always the case. 
The rules of evidence for the Tribunal favored the prosecution however, making 
its job to convict the defendants simpler. The Charter provided ground rules for evidence 
in Section IV, Powers of Tribunal and Conduct of Trial. In Article 13, the Charter stated 
that "the Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and 
apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall 
admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value. All purported admissions or 
statements of the accused are admissible."38 This allowed the United States to easily 
accomplish its goal of punishing major war criminals, but undermined the desire to 
demonstrate democratic principles and fair trials. The American civilian perspective of 
rules of evidence was more stringent and would not have allowed many of the items 
listed in the Charter into evidence. The list of admissible evidence clearly demonstrates 
the failure to adhere to common technical rules. "Regardless of its security classification 
and without proof of its issuance or signature, which appears to the Tribunal to have been 
signed or issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the armed forces of 
37 SCAP, Charter, Article 9a-e. 
38 SCAP, Charter, Article 13 a. By allowing the Tribunal to adopt expeditious and non-technical 
procedure, the Charter does seem to support the defense's argument as stated by Maga that the Tribunal 
emphasized speed over justice. Maga, Judgement at Tokyo, 43. 
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any government," any document was admissible. Also acceptable were those which 
appeared to have been signed or issued by the International Red Cross, doctors, medical 
service personnel, investigators, intelligence officers, or "any other person who appears 
to the Tribunal to have personal knowledge of the matters contained in the report."40 
Affidavits, diaries, letters, and sworn or unsworn statements that appeared to have 
information related to the charge were admissible, as were copies if the original 
document was unavailable.41 One of the most valuable pieces of evidence used by the 
prosecution was the diary of Koichi Kido, Hirohito's advisor and Lord Keeper of the 
Privy Seal. Since Kido kept record of the years prior to and during the war, and since 
those records contained information related to the charges, the diary was admitted as 
evidence. Finally, the Tribunal did not require proof "of facts of common knowledge, 
nor of the authenticity of official government documents and reports of any nation nor of 
the proceedings, records, and findings of military or other agencies of any of the United 
Nations."42 While the United States, some Tribunal members, and even some Japanese 
argued that the Tokyo Trial was fair and just, the disregard for technical rules of evidence 
did seem to bias the proceedings and aid the prosecution in making its case. 
It is easy to criticize the tribunal for the relaxed rules of evidence; however the 
IMTFE occupied a unique position. As a military court, it followed different rules than a 
civilian court. Yet in its attempt to model western jurisprudence for the Japanese and at 
the same time consider the problems associated with an international tribunal and the 
39 SCAP, Charter, Article 13cl. 
40 SCAP, Charter, Article 13c2. The Charter does not require proof that these documents be signed by Red 
Cross or medical personnel and instead relies on the justices to make the determination. 
41 SCAP, Charter, Article 13c3-5. 
42 SCAP, Charter, Article 13 d. The justices again are given the responsibility of determining whether or 
not documents submitted into evidence are authentic. These rulings rely on the judges refraining from any 
bias on their part and carefully examining submitted evidence. It presents a disadvantage to the defendants 
since they could not be guaranteed that the judges were free from bias in this process. 
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destruction of evidence, the tribunal was forced to alter the rules of evidence. While the 
relaxed rules did aid the prosecution, the criticism of the court's bias against the defense 
regarding evidence could stem from Webb's obvious contempt for the defendants. 
A brief section of the Charter outlined the trial proceedings. After the indictment, 
the accused made his plea, and the prosecution delivered opening statements. The 
prosecution and defense then made their cases, and the Tribunal delivered the judgment 
and sentences after deliberation.43 The Tribunal was able to impose any sentence it 
deemed just, including death, if the defendants were convicted.44 Sentences could not be 
carried out until approved by SCAP and SCAP could reduce or alter sentences, but not 
increase their severity.45 The review process introduced a mechanism to ensure the trials 
did not simply sentence all defendants to death to extract revenge for Japan's actions 
during the war. 
KEY PLAYERS: JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND APPOINTMENT 
CONTROVERSY 
While waiting for the nominations of judges from the Allied nations, MacArthur 
established the International Prosecution Section (IPS) for the IMTFE. One of his first 
appointments was Joseph B. Keenan as the Chief Prosecutor for the IPS. Keenan worked 
in the Department of Justice from 1933 to 1939 and at one point was the Assistant 
Attorney General of the United States in charge of the Criminal Division. He later served 
as the Assistant to the Attorney General. At the time of his appointment as Chief 
43 SCAP, Charter, Article 15a-h. 
44 SCAP, Charter, Article 16. 
45 SCAP, Charter, Article 17. This prevented the reviewing authority from increasing sentences based on 
his personal opinion. 
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Prosecutor of the IMTFE, Keenan had a private practice in Washington.46 President 
Truman's Executive Order No. 9660 established Keenan's responsibilities as Chief 
Prosecutor on 29 November 1945. The order allowed Keenan to "select and 
recommend.. .necessary personnel to assist him in the performance of his duties" as well 
as to "cooperate with, and to receive the assistance of, any foreign Government to the 
extent deemed necessary by him for the accomplishment of his duties."47 
A slow response from other Allied nations involved in the trial process delayed 
the Tribunal. In October, governments were asked to provide designees, but it was not 
until December that MacArthur received a message asking for further information 
including the number of judges that would sit on the Tribunal, their rank, the rules and 
jurisdiction of the court, and the organization of the prosecuting staff. Although 
Washington asked MacArthur for his opinion on these matters, the JCS provided their 
own "politically desirable" suggested answers: the Tribunal would consist of judges 
nominated by the Allied government, as well as one alternate; each judge would hold the 
rank of Major General or its equivalent; the jurisdiction of the court would only cover 
Class A war criminals; and the rules of the court would be modeled after Nuremberg. 
The original Charter called for nine members to sit on the Tribunal, although in 
acknowledgement of international cooperation, the United States later amended the 
charter to add a representative from India and the Philippines48 
46 CINCAFPAC ADV (MacArthur Personal) from Washington (Secretary of War), 2 November 1945. 
MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 
September 1945-21 June 1946." 
47 Executive Order 9660, the White House, 29 November 1945. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, 
VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder War Crimes 1-110. 
48 IMTFE, Judgment, 6. 
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Finally, each government would nominate one associate prosecutor to assist the 
Chief Prosecutor. The JCS expressed their desire for the trial to begin on 15 January 
1946 and set a 1 January 1946 deadline for nominations from the Allied nations.49 
MacArthur, with input from Keenan, made only a few changes to the recommendations 
provided by the JCS. He suggested that no alternates be provided, as "they will tend to 
embarrass rather than facilitate the action, due to the many problems of accommodation, 
transportation, and other local matters." MacArthur's memo also included a stipulation 
that he, as SCAP, would designate the President of the Tribunal, as well as establish the 
courts and its rules of procedure, including the admissibility of evidence. MacArthur 
pushed the start date of the trial back to 1 February 1946 and requested that no publicity 
be given to the trials until the indictment was delivered.50 Allied nations began to 
provide nominations after they received the information on the organization of the 
tribunal.51 
A disagreement over the appointment of the United States representative indicated 
that the Tokyo Trial was not held in high regard. On 18 January 1946, the day before 
MacArthur established the IMTFE, Keenan recommended that the JCS nominate Willis 
Smith, the President of the American Bar Association to the IMTFE.52 President Truman 
however, designated the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Council of Massachusetts 
49 CINCAFPAC ADV (MacArthur) from Washington (JCS), 20 December 1945. MacArthur Memorial 
Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 June 
1946." 
50 WARCOS (JCS) from CINCAFPAC ADV, 22 December 1945. MacArthur Memorial Archives, 
Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 June 1946." 
51 Delegates were as follows: Sir William Webb, Australia; Justice E. Stuart McDougall, Canada; Justice 
Henri Bernard, France; Justice Bernard ROling, The Netherlands; I. M. Zaryanov, the Soviet Union; Lord 
William Patrick, United Kingdom; Justice John Higgins, United States; Judge Delfin Jaranilla, the 
Philippines; Justice Radhabinod Pal, India. 
52 WARCOS (JCS) from CINCAFPAC ADV, 18 January 1946. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, 
VA, Record Group 9, Box, 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 June 1946." 
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John P. Higgins as the American representative. It is unclear why Truman was so intent 
on appointing Higgins. Brackman states that the reasons for the appointment were "lost 
in the murky Democratic politics of the era."54 Keenan swiftly appealed to the United 
States Attorney General, as well as to the Judge Advocate General (JAG) in Washington. 
He urged the nomination of Higgins to be reconsidered, as the appointment "would not fit 
in with any of the other appointments being made by the Allied Nations from the 
standpoint of prestige and rank."55 Keenan wanted someone better known nationally and 
opposed Higgins since he was known only within Massachusetts.56 He explained that 
Mac Arthur intended to appoint the American judge as President of the Tribunal, which 
made a more prestigious and well known American nominee necessary.57 Keenan's 
sentiment was much the same in his message to the JAG, and he made several other 
f  A  
suggestions for nominees if Willis Smith were unavailable. Washington ignored 
Keenan's advice however, and President Truman appointed Higgins.59 Disappointed 
with Truman's choice, MacArthur chose the Australian Webb as President of the 
Tribunal. Higgins would not only fail to match the rank of the justices from the other 
Allied countries in Keenan's opinion, but he would place the United States in an 
awkward position less than a month after the prosecution began making its case by 
53 CINCAFPAC ADV (Keenan) from Washington (JAG), 20 January 1946. MacArthur Memorial 
Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 June 
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35 Tom C. Clark, Attorney General, Washington DC from CINCAFPAC ADV (Keenan), 21 January 1946. 
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requesting to be relieved of his assignment. Stating that he was assured by the Attorney 
General that his responsibilities on the Tribunal would be complete in time to allow him 
to return to the Superior Court of Massachusetts and resume his duties as Chief Justice, 
Higgins submitted his resignation.60 The Office of Civil Affairs in the War Department 
urged him to reconsider his resignation, but ultimately he returned to the United States 
and Major General Myron C. Cramer was appointed to replace Higgins.61 He served for 
the remainder of the trial.62 If Higgins were in fact unqualified to serve on the tribunal, 
Justice Roling felt that Cramer was not much of an improvement and stated that Cramer 
was "not a very great authority."63 Trumans' failure to appoint a high ranking justice 
and Higgins's disregard for his responsibilities as part of the IMTFE suggest that 
Washington did not consider the trial highly important or fully understand the complex 
procedure it was undertaking in the trial. 
Yuki Takatori offers another view on the Higgins debacle. Takatori described 
Higgins as very active politically, civically, and in his community, a man who 
accomplished much in life. In 1937 at age 44, Higgins was the youngest man to become 
the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court.64 Takatori attributes Keenan's 
surprise and anger at the appointment of Higgins to a break down in communication. The 
Attorney General's Office sent Keenan a list of possible nominees, which Keenan never 
60 John P. Higgins to General Douglas MacArthur, 21 June 1946. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, 
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received.65 Keenan then took it upon himself to nominate Smith and became upset when 
his suggestion was ignored. Keenan felt that Higgins lacked the experience necessary to 
participate in the trial. Higgins however proved himself capable in the short time he was 
in Tokyo and won the respect of the President of the Tribunal William Webb. Webb 
even sought advice from Higgins on trial related matters.66 The judges' relationship and 
Webb's respect for Higgins was an indication that Higgins was knowledgeable, 
competent, and well suited to sit on the bench. 
Clearly, Higgins lost interest in the trial by mid-June, and once it was clear that 
court proceedings would continue well past the promised six month mark, he began to 
consider leaving Tokyo. He felt that a prolonged absence on his part was unfair to 
Massachusetts, which was his primary concern. It also appears that Higgins began to 
view the trial as a failure and he perhaps did not want to be associated with it. In his 
diary, Higgins records the problems he saw with the trial, including the appointment of 
Keenan, who he considered a second rate attorney, incompetent American defense 
(\1 
lawyers, and a personal belief that "the Japanese are being railroaded." The issues 
pointed out by Higgins are some of the most scathing criticisms that arose after the trial. 
Takatori believes that Higgins's resignation completely changed the outcome of 
the Tokyo Trial. Cramer, Higgins's replacement, was a hanging judge who voted for the 
death penalty for nine defendants, seven of whom were hanged. Higgins, a liberal judge 
possessing a negative view of the trial, would have most likely voted against the death 
penalty, which would have saved at least one defendant from execution. Takatori also 
65 Takatori, "The Forgotten Judge at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial," 119-120. 
66 Takatori, "The Forgotten Judge at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial," 124. According to many accounts, 
Webb was not any easy man to get along with, and Takatori states that Higgins was the only person at the 
trial who got along with him. Their friendship continued even after Higgins resigned. 
67 Takatori, "The Forgotten Judge at the Tokyo Trial," 128-130. 
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believes Higgins might have written a separate opinion or dissent, which would have 
raised serious questions about the goals and legal integrity of the trial.68 The entries in 
Higgins's diary raise questions about the real focus of the United States during the trial. 
He certainly recorded a feeling that the US was not as invested in the trial as it claimed. 
Whatever the reason Higgins chose to resign, whether it was over concern for his home 
court or the issues surrounding the trial, Yuma Totani states that he would have been 
unable to resign so easily if the United States had attached real importance to the Tokyo 
Trial.69 
The appointment of American prosecutors to the IPS also indicated the United 
States did not necessarily send their most capable to Tokyo. The original staff was 
composed of thirty nine Americans who arrived in Tokyo in December 1945. American 
defense lawyers were required since Japanese lawyers were unfamiliar with the common 
law court procedures used at the trial. In order to provide the defendants with a proper 
70 defense, American attorneys familiar with these practices were necessary. As 
appointments from other Allied nations trickled in, the IPS grew into a massive 
multinational force. At its peak, over five hundred lawyers, stenographers, and clerical 
staff worked for the IPS. Not all Allied countries sent teams as large as the United 
States', although the large prosecution team could have been another tactic to indicate 
strength and perhaps dedication to the cause, since so many American attorneys were 
devoted to the trial. Each additional Allied country provided at least one lead prosecutor. 
Of the eleven lead prosecutors, Arthur S. Comyns-Carr from the United Kingdom and 
Justice Alan J. Mansfield from Australia played the largest role in the IPS next to 
68 Takatori, "The Forgotten Judge at the Tokyo Trial," 136. 
69 Totani, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond, 41. 
70 Takatori, "The Forgotten Judge at the Tokyo Trial," 127. 
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Keenan. Comyns-Carr and Mansfield assisted the IPS in completing investigations, 
determining defendants, and completing the final draft of the indictment.71 Comyns-Carr, 
a former member of the British Parliament, worked along with Mansfield who had 
already investigated Japanese war crimes in New Guinea. The appointees from the 
remaining Allied Nations were just as impressive.72 
In contrast to some of his international colleagues, Keenan did not possess any 
knowledge of the history of Asia and was not well versed in international law. Rumored 
to be a drunkard, Keenan was flamboyant and controversial, and often worked himself 
into a frenzy in the courtroom. Both the prosecution and defense questioned his 
appointment. A prosecutor on his own staff stated that Keenan did not measure up to the 
job, while Beverly Coleman, chief of the American Defense Counsel for a short time, 
stated that Keenan "was a good lawyer, but he was not the man to handle a trial like 
this."73 Even many on the American prosecution team admitted that the teams from the 
other Allied countries were of a higher caliber.74 The prosecutors from the other Allied 
countries were highly experienced, and many had distinguished careers in their home 
countries. The high caliber appointments by the other Allied nations as compared to the 
United States, coupled with the embarrassment over the resignation of Higgins reflected 
poorly on the United States and its commitment to the Tokyo Trial. 
71 Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 18-19. 
72 See Brackman, The Other Nuremberg for a complete description of the remaining Allied prosecutors and 
their roles prior to the trial. 
73 Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, 54-55. 
74 Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, 61. 
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PROBLEMS WITH THE DEFENSE 
At the Tokyo Trial, there were clear indications of favoritism toward the 
prosecution. The defense experienced myriad problems, including translation difficulties 
and an inadequate staff. Favoring the prosecution facilitated conviction and punishment 
of Japan's major war criminals. While those in charge were punished Japan could focus 
on rehabilitating and rebuilding itself to join the global community. 
MacArthur took these lack of fairness complaints seriously and handled many 
himself since he wanted to create a positive atmosphere for his Occupation Government. 
He was particularly concerned about a complaint that the defense counsel had been 
established only for propaganda purposes and not actually to accomplish anything during 
the trial.75 The defense was well aware of the disadvantages their team faced and felt as 
though it existed merely for show, rather than actually to try to prove the innocence of its 
clients. 
Problems for the defense counsel began early in the trial. On 31 May 1946, 
MacArthur received a lengthy memo and eight resignation letters from American 
members of the defense team which was at the time composed of 27 attorneys and 42 
administrative assistants. Penned by Captain Beverly Coleman, the memo outlined the 
major issues facing the defense and complained the defense "is presently without any 
organizational connection" and lacking "any official status or recognition the group can 
not function administratively nor can vital and essential activities be either undertaken or 
accomplished." Coleman decried the lack of organizational structure and claimed to try to 
impose order to provide "the Japanese defendants with American lawyers of suitable 
experience and qualifications to assure the Japanese defendants proper representation and 
75 Maga, Judgment at Tokyo, 53-54. 
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adequate defense." Coleman also found fault with the assignment of the defense to the 
IMTFE. The IPS fell under the authority of SCAP, and Coleman argued that SCAP 
should oversee the defense as well. SCAP insisted the defense should function under the 
IMTFE, which refused to accept the defense as an agent of the court. Coleman 
concluded by explaining that the present situation would "preclude any effective or 
adequate defense of the accused, and further, will bring discredit upon all of the members 
of the group, upon the Tribunal, upon the authority which provided these counsel to the 
Japanese defendants, and to American lawyers generally." The American attorneys' 
resignation letters varied in length but most reflected Coleman's sentiments. The letters 
explained they could not "honorably continue voluntarily to be associated with an 
7 f\ 
enterprise which can not be effectively or properly prosecuted." These resignations 
indicate that the defense attorneys took their appointments seriously and were willing to 
prepare a proper defense for the Japanese suspects. The United States however, in its 
attempt to meet its occupation goals was concerned only with appearances and not 
necessarily providing the Japanese with a suitable defense. The large contingent of 
lawyers would suggest that the United States was fulfilling its promise to provide an 
adequate defense for the Japanese defendants. However, in his diary, Justice Higgins 
described the "nitwit" lawyers who fought amongst themselves and only sought to use 
the trial as a career move and collect a solid paycheck from the US government. Higgins 
considered the appointed lawyers to be unskilled and an obstacle to a decent defense.77 
76 SCAP thru Chief of Legal Section, SCAP, American Defense Activities, 31 May 1946. Mac Arthur 
Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 5, Box 1, Folder 2 "Master File November 1945-March 
1946." 
77 Takatori, "The Forgotten Judge at the Tokyo Trial," 129-130. 
These lawyers challenged Coleman and his authority and caused the rift that led to 
Coleman's resignation. 
MacArthur replied to each of the resignations personally, urging the attorneys to 
reconsider their withdrawal for several reasons. First, he stated that as SCAP, his duties 
were to "establish the Tribunal, to promulgate its charter, and to establish the 
International Prosecution."78 The organization of the tribunal, of IPS, and the conduct of 
the trials were beyond his purview, and after the arraignment of the defendants SCAP's 
power was limited to reviewing the case upon its conclusion. MacArthur explained his 
only responsibility regarding the defense was to make lawyers available to the suspects 
and make arrangements for the defense team's equipment and working and living 
quarters. Second, MacArthur argued that the resignations were difficult to justify since 
the difficulties broached in the memo and resignation letters were at that point only 
speculative since they were submitted only shortly after the trial began. He stated that "it 
is believed that until such conditions actually develop, your application is based upon 
conjecture and that the prejudice you thereby throw on the entire proceeding is not 
warranted at this time."79 Despite MacArthur's intervention, Coleman and the entire 
Navy contingent of the defense team followed through on their resignations.80 
The problems for the defense did not end with its organizational woes. The 
attorneys complained of a shortage of interpreters and assistants, an issue that affected 
their ability to prepare their case. While the IPS had 102 translators, the defense counsel 
78John W. Guider thru Chief Legal Section, SCAP from General Headquarters (hereafter GHQ), SCAP, 2 
June 1946. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 5, Box 1, Folder 2 "Master File, 
November 45-December 46." 
79 John W. Guider thru Chief Legal Section, SCAP from General Headquarters (hereafter GHQ), SCAP, 2 
June 1946. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 5, Box 1, Folder 2 "Master File, 
November 45-December 46." 
80 Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, 115. 
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had three. It faced a shortage of typists and clerks, forcing the defense team to work late 
hours and weekends to try to keep up with the paperwork. Defense attorneys such as Ben 
Bruce Blakeney, who was bilingual, often worked at translating documents at the expense 
of preparing his client's case. Several times the defense attorneys were forced to ask the 
court for a recess because they were unprepared to present or move forward with their 
a t  
case due to equipment and personnel problems. 
Favoritism toward the prosecution was also shown during courtroom proceedings. 
R. John Pritchard, the senior editor and compiler of the Tokyo War Trial Project, stated 
that "much of what they did offer in evidence was rejected by the court for trivial or 
specious reasons" and the rulings of the tribunal concerning the provenance of 
documents, hearsay, cumulative evidence.. .deprived the defence of a great deal of 
valuable evidence." This is likely due to the bias shown toward the defense by the bench, 
particularly in Webb's case. Webb often openly expressed his disgust and contempt 
toward the defendants, and as President of the tribunal he determined court proceedings. 
The Allied governments offered a great deal of assistance to the prosecution in securing 
documents and evidence, but often restricted similar efforts by the defense counsel. Even 
though the IMTFE Charter stipulated that the defense would receive assistance, the trial 
records support the defense's contentions.82 The length of the trial may have contributed 
to this restriction. By the time the defense presented its case, the trial had dragged on 
much longer than anticipated and many of the participants had lost interest. In order to 
speed up the proceedings, the bench was much stricter on the admission of evidence. 
Though the Allies claimed they were unbiased and the IMTFE Charter provided for the 
81 Brackmann, The Other Nuremberg, 113-115, 309-310. 
82 Pritchard, "An Overview of the Historical Importance of the Tokyo War Trial," 26-27. 
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rights of the accused, the actions of the Allies were hypocritical. The court looked to 
rush through the trial and many involved lost interest when the trial dragged on. The 
bench constantly favored the prosecution, and the defense faced enormous obstacles in 
preparing its case. The United States did not model the democratic principles it hoped to 
convey to the Japanese, but rather made a half-hearted attempt to provide an example of 
western style justice while preoccupied with Cold War tensions. 
THE DEFENDANTS AND THE INDICTMENT 
Although all parties were not in place in January 1946, those present participated 
in writing the indictment and identifying the Class A defendants, approved by 
Mac Arthur.83 The indictment filed on 29 April 1946 charged twenty-eight Japanese who 
had occupied high level government and military posts between 1928 and 1945, as shown 
in Table 1. Each defendant had held multiple offices and participated in multiple phases 
of the war, allowing the IPS to cover a wide range of atrocities while at the same time 
limiting the number of defendants.84 Among the defendants were former members of the 
cabinet, the diplomatic corps, the Privy Council, the army general staff, and the Lord 
Keeper of the Privy Seal.85 The men who occupied these positions had been responsible 
for overseeing POW camps, organizing Japan's educational system, and publishing 
propaganda. They had organized the alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy and 
planned major military movements, such as the occupations of Manchuria and Korea and 
the attack on Pearl Harbor. Solis Horwitz claimed that these defendants were chosen by 
83 SCAP (for Atcheson/Keenan) from Washington, 20 January 1946. Mac Arthur Memorial Archives, 
Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 June 1946." 
84Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 64-65 and Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 14-16. 
85 Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 64-65. 
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the IPS not only as representatives of high level government and military organizations 
during Japan's aggressive phase, but also because they could be charged with crimes 
against peace, they held positions of leadership, and their chances for acquittal were 
slim.86 
Defendant Roles Responsibilities 
Sadao Araki Former Minister of War and Minister 
of Education. 
Organized the Japanese 
school system along 
military lines. 
Kenji Doihara Former commander of the Kwantung 
Army and member of the Supreme 
War Council. 
Ran POW camps in several 
locations, such as Malaya, 
Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. 
Kingoro 
Hashimoto 
Assisted in staging the Mukden 
Incident, leading to war with China. 
Published racist 
propaganda and helped 
sway Japanese public 
opinion in support of the 
war. 
Shunroku Hata Former Minister of War. Helped plan Japan's 
invasion of China. Hata 
commanded troops who 
committed atrocities 
against Chinese civilians. 
Kiichiro 
Hiranuma 
Held many political positions in the 
Emperor's Cabinet, including 
Premier and President of the Privy 
Council. 
Was a well known political 
figure in Japan. 
Koki Hirota Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 
Premier, and Foreign Minister. 
During his time as Foreign 
Minister the Rape of 
Nanking occurred. 
Naoki Hoshino Former Chief of Financial Affairs, 
Minister without Portfolio, and Chief 
Cabinet Secretary. 
Played a role in Japan's 
occupation of Manchuria. 
Seishiro Itagaki Former Chief of Staff, Minister of 
War, and member of the Supreme 
War Council. 
Controlled POW camps in 
Java, Sumatra, Malaya and 
Borneo. Soldiers under his 
command committed 
atrocities against POWs 
and civilians. 
Table 1: Class A Defendants and their Roles and Responsibilities 
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Defendant Roles Responsibilities 
Okinori Kaya Former Minister of Finance. Supported drug trafficking 
in China, exploited China's 
natural resources. 
Koichi Kido Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Kido was close to the 
Emperor during the war. 
Heitaro Kimura Foraier Chief of Staff, Vice Minister 
of War and member of the Supreme 
War Council. 
Approved the brutalization 
of Allied POWs and was 
the field commander in 
Burma while the Death 
Railway was built. 
Kuniaki Koiso Former Vice Minister of War, Chief 
of Staff, Army Commander and 
Premier. 
Koiso was brutal to Korean 
civilians during the 
Japanese occupation and 
was aware of the atrocities 
in POW camps during his 
time as Premiere. 
Iwane Matsui Commander of the China 
Expeditionary Force. 
The troops under Matsui's 
command committed 




Former Foreign Minister. Outspoken supporter of 
Japan's expansionist 
tendencies and organized 
the Axis Alliance with 
Germany and Italy. 
Jiro Minami Former Minister of War, member of 
the Supreme War Council, and 
member of the Privy Council. 
Controlled Korea during 
the Japanese occupation. 
AkiraMuto Former Director of the Military 
Affairs Bureau and Army 
Commander. 
In charge of troops who 
committed atrocities 
during the Rape of 
Nanking and the Rape of 
Manila. Muto also ran 
POW camps in Sumatra. 
Osami Nagano Former Navy Minister, Navy Chief 
of Staff, and Naval Advisor to the 
Emperor. 
Helped plan the attack on 
Pearl Harbor. 
Takasumi Oka Former Chief of the Naval Affairs 
Bureau and Vice Minister of the 
Navy. 
Assisted in planning the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. 
Oka's bureau issued orders 
for the transportation of 
Allied POWs on hellships 
and to shoot any survivors 
of downed Allied ships. 
Table 1 Continued 
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Defendant Roles Responsibilities 
Shumei Okawa Did not hold any official government 
positions. 
Played a role in the 
Mukden Incident, and was 




Former Ambassador to Germany. Helped create the Axis 
Alliance with Germany 
and Italy. 
Kenryo Sato Former Chief of the Military Affairs 
Bureau and Army Commander. 
Approved orders on the 
treatment of POWs and 
civilians who worked on 
the Death Railway. 
Mamoru 
Shigemitsu 
Former Ambassador to China, Great 
Britain, and the Soviet Union. 
Actually desired an end to 
the war, but the Soviet 
Union insisted on his arrest 
as a war criminal. 
Shigetaro 
Shimada 
Former Commander of the China 
Fleet, Navy Minister, and member of 
the Supreme War Council. 
Authorized the attack on 
Pearl Harbor. He also 
commanded naval units 
that committed atrocities 
against Allied POWs. 
Toshio Shiratori Former Ambassador to Italy and 
advisor to the Foreign Minister. 
Assisted Oshima in 
creating the Axis Alliance 
with Germany and Italy. 
Teiichi Suzuki Former Chief of the China Affairs 
Bureau and political advisor. 
Played a role in drug 
trafficking in China and 
was aware of the use of 
POWs and civilians as 
slave labor. 
Shigenori Togo Former Ambassador to Germany and 
the Soviet Union. 
Prior to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, Togo was in 
charge of peace 
negotiations with the 
United States. 
Hideki Tojo Former Chief of Staff, Vice Minister 
of War, Minister of War, and 
Premiere. 
Controlled the Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs, Home 
Affairs, and Education, 




Former Vice Minister of War and 
Army Chief of Staff. 
A well known and feared 
leader in Japan and key 
member of the militaristic 
army clique that assumed 
control. 
able 1 Continued 
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Only twenty-five of the twenty-eight indicted sat through the trial and received sentences 
as Shumei Okawa was declared mentally unfit, and Yosuke Matsuoka and Osami Nagano 
died during the trial of tuberculosis and natural causes, respectively.87 
The indictment against the 28 Japanese wartime leaders described the conspiracy 
between Germany, Italy, and Japan to dominate and exploit the rest of the world and 
threaten basic principles of liberty.88 According to the indictment, the defendants took 
advantage "of their power and their official positions and their own personal prestige and 
influence" and violated international law as well as Japan's treaty obligations.89 All of 
the defendants pled not guilty to the charges filed against them, and court proceedings for 
the Tokyo Trial finally began on 3 May 1946. 
Charges against the defendants were organized into three groups. Group One, or 
Class A crimes, contained counts one through thirty-six. These counts cover aggressive 
warfare and the execution of conspiracy for military, naval, political, and economic 
domination by Japan over various areas of East Asia, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as 
well as accounts of aggression against the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, India, the Philippines, the Netherlands, France, and the Soviet 
Union. According to Brackman, the main theme of the indictment was the domination of 
foreign and domestic policy in Japan by a "criminal militaristic clique."90 Therefore, the 
counts in Group One began in 1928 with actions taken by Japan against the Republic of 
China, up to the end of the war in 1945 and thus covered all of Japan's actions during that 
87 Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, 93,406-413. 
88 International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Indictment, Harry S. Truman Presidential Museum and 
Library 
http://www.trumanlibrarv.org/whistlestop/studv collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?documentdat 
e=0000-00-00&documentid= 18-2&pagenumber= 1. 1 (accessed 19 September 2011). 
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90 Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, 84. 
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time period. This way any actions taken by Japan during those years could be used 
during the trial. The attack on Pearl Harbor as well as other attacks on 7 December 1941 
in the Pacific were included in this group. The counts in Group One formed the basis for 
the Tokyo Trial. Without these charges, the tribunal had no jurisdiction. 
Twenty-three of the thirty-six counts charged all of the defendants, while the 
remaining counts cited specific defendants for particular actions, such as the attacks on 7 
December 1941.91 These thirty-six counts cover ten phases of the war. Some of the 
earliest counts cover aggression in Manchuria beginning in 1931, and military aggression 
throughout China beginning in 1937. Economic aggression, corruption, and coercion in 
China and other parts of Asia were also included. Other phases of the war included 
general preparations for war, military control of the Japanese government, the formation 
of alliances with Germany and Italy, and aggressive warfare against the United States, the 
Soviet Union, the Philippines, Great Britain, and the Netherlands and Portugal.92 The 
broad language again allowed the prosecution to easily use any of Japan's actions as 
evidence in their case against the defendants. Aggressive warfare charges and the 
"brutal" language of the indictment allowed for accusations against the defendants for 
perpetrating atrocities in their scheme to dominate East Asia.93 Since aggressive warfare 
was considered the most serious war crime, it is logical that the majority of the charges in 
the indictment are for crimes against peace. 
Since the defendants were the key planners and leaders in maneuvering the 
Japanese to war, they were also judged responsible for Japan's wartime atrocities. 
Counts 37 to 52 in Group Two covered charges of murder. In the indictment, Group Two 
91IMTFE, Indictment, 2-9. 
92 Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 65-66. 
93 Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, 84. 
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did not directly charge the defendants with committing murder, but of "initiating 
unlawful hostilities...unlawfully ordering, causing and permitting the armed forces of 
Japan to attack the territory, ships and airplanes of the said nations."94 It described the 
victims as "both members of the armed forces of the said nations and civilians, as might 
happen to be in the places at the times of such attacks."95 Group Two charges included 
"ordering, causing and permitting the armed forces of Japan" to carry out the attacks on 7 
December 1941 at Pearl Harbor, Kota Bahru, Hong Kong and Davao, as well as on the 
H.M.S. Petrel.96 The remainder of the accounts in Group Two included charges for 
allowing the Rape of Nanking and similar attacks against civilians and POWs in other 
locations such as Canton, Hankow, Changsha, Hengyang, Kweilin, Liuchow, Mongolia, 
and the territories of the Soviet Union.97 Many of the charges in Group Two repeated the 
charges in Group One and would eventually be dismissed by the Tribunal. By the 
prosecution's reasoning though, killings that occurred during an illegal war were murder. 
It was odd that charges for murder were included in an indictment for an international 
military tribunal when the main charge was aggressive warfare and none of the accused 
was personally responsible for murder. The IMTFE was the first time that murder had 
been prosecuted at the international level.98 Keenan recognized this peculiarity and in a 
press statement issued at the time the indictment was lodged stated "it is high time, and 
indeed was so before this war began, that the promoters of aggressive, ruthless war and 
treaty-breakers should be stripped of the glamour of national heroes and exposed as what 
94 IMTFE, Indictment, 9. 
95 IMTFE, Indictment, 9. 
96 IMTFE, Indictment, 10-11. Japan's attack on December 7, 1941 had multiple targets, although most of 
them have been forgotten with the exception of Pearl Harbor. The tribunal threw out all of these charges 
since the acts described in the counts fell under the aggressive warfare charges. 
97 IMTFE, Indictment, 11-12. 
98 Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 154. 
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they really are—plain, ordinary murderers."99 By stating the defendants were really only 
murderers, Keenan seemed to imply that murder-which fell under conventional war 
crimes or crimes against humanity-was a crime as serious as aggressive warfare. By 
likening the defendants to those who faced Class BC charges, Keenan also removed the 
heroic status associated with Japan's leaders during the war. 
As with the counts in Group Two, the counts in Group Three did not necessarily 
charge the defendants with personally committing any war crimes. None of the 
defendants in fact were convicted of personally committing war crimes. Group Three 
covered conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity, charging the defendants 
with responsibility for "all acts performed by themselves or by any person in execution" 
of a common plan or conspiracy.100 As Japan's wartime leaders, the defendants were 
held responsible for the actions of their subordinates. Count 53 and 54 covered the 
atrocities committed against Allied POWs. Count 55 charged that the defendants 
"deliberately and recklessly disregarded their legal duty to take adequate steps to secure 
the observances and prevent breaches thereof, and thereby violated the laws of war."101 
Events such as the Rape of Nanking and the Rape of Manila fell under this count. The 
remainder of the indictment, consisting of several appendices, summarizes the 
background information for the events listed in the counts, the ten phases of the war, the 
99 Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, 84-85. 
100IMTFE, Indictment, 13. The defendants essentially faced command responsibility charges. As leaders, 
they "should have known" about the actions of their subordinates and controlled those actions. This 
precedent was set at the trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, held in Manila from October to December 
1945. For a detailed study of the Yamashita case, see Richard L. Lael's The Yamashita Precedent: War 
Crimes and Command Responsibility (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1982). 
101 IMTFE, Indictment, 13. This charge covered military personnel as well as civilians in any of the 
territories occupied by Japan prior to and during the war. The crimes against humanity charge allowed for 
the prosecution of a state for its actions against its civilians, a measure taken in response to Germany's 
actions against Jews. The areas colonized by Japan at this time would have placed its civilians under 
Japan's rule, allowing the defendants to be charged with crimes against humanity. 
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treaties broken by Japan, and the statements of individual responsibility for crimes as 
described in the indictment.102 The indictment was thorough and well planned, and 
provided the public with an overview of Japan's actions leading to and during the war. 
Since most of the public was unaware of the situation, the indictment served as one of the 
first lessons in the reeducation of the Japanese people in the Allied version of World War 
II history. 
TABOO TOPICS 
Perhaps the strongest indication that the Americans had interests other than the 
prosecution of Japanese war criminals was their handling of certain aspects of the Tokyo 
Trial. The United States avoided several issues during the trial, including questions with 
regard to the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 
and the Japanese experiments with bacteriological and biological warfare. None of the 
Allied nations represented on the Tribunal faced charges for its wartime actions. 
Awaya Kentaro describes the Allies as pursing their fact finding mission "half­
heartedly."103 Kentaro states the United States impeded the progress of the trial in several 
ways, including by its refusal to try Hirohito as a war criminal. The United States also 
avoided indicting any of the defendants on charges of bacteriological or biological 
warfare. Unit 731, the Japanese organization that focused on developing bacteriological 
and biological weapons during the war, carried out experiments on civilians to test their 
creations. The Americans were well aware of Unit 731 and its activities during the 
Tokyo Trial, but United States' officials chose to withhold this information, in light of 
102IMTFE, Indictment, Appendices A-E. 
103 Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 248. 
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their own desire to gain the biological warfare technology before the Soviet Union. On 7 
February 1947, MacArthur requested instructions from Washington on how to handle a 
request by the Soviet prosecutor to interrogate three Japanese connected with 
bacteriological warfare research. The Soviet prosecutor requested interviews with 
General Ishii, Colonel Kikughi, and Colonel Ota, who were connected with experiments 
at the Pingfan Laboratory in Manchuria. The Russians believed the United States would 
authorize supplementary bacteriological war crimes trials, for which they were preparing, 
but they also admitted an interest in obtaining knowledge about the mass production of 
typhus, cholera bacteria, and typhus bearing fleas, foci of the research in Pingfan. 
MacArthur's personal opinion was that the Russians would not gain any information not 
already known to the United States, but that the United States might gain additional 
information from a monitored interrogation by the Soviets.104 The JCS replied on 21 
March 1947 with several conditions that would have to be met for MacArthur to allow a 
Soviet interview. Competent United States personnel would first interview Colonels 
Kikuchi and Ota. If Kikuchi and Ota divulged any information that the Soviets should 
not be permitted to learn they would be instructed not to reveal that information to the 
Soviets. They would also be instructed not to mention the interview with the United 
States. Finally, MacArthur was instructed to make it clear that granting permission for 
the interview was an "amiable gesture toward a friendly Government" since the USSR 
had no defined interest in alleged war crimes committed by the Japanese against the 
104 WDCSA from CINCFE, 7 February 1947. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 
9, Box 159, Folder 2 "Radiograms 25 June 1946-17 November 1948." 
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Chinese. Allowing the interview also could not be taken as a precedent and future 
requests might not be granted.105 
As the situation progressed, the United States obtained statements from Ishii 
through "persuasion, exploitation of Japanese fear of USSR, and desire to cooperate with 
US." Ishii requested immunity from war crimes charges for himself, his superiors, and 
subordinates in exchange for detailed information regarding this research. The United 
States expected to gain more detailed information on these topics using the same tactics 
against lower ranked Japanese personnel. The Japanese interviewed would also be 
informed that the information would not be used as war crimes evidence. On 3 June 
1947, the United States requested information concerning possible war crimes evidence 
or charges by any of the Allies against Ishii or members his unit. The United States was 
particularly concerned with field trials conducted against the Chinese soldiers or research 
focusing on the effects of bacteriological warfare on plant life.106 Only three days later, 
Alva C. Carpenter, the Chief of Legal Section, replied that "the reports and files of the 
Legal Section on Ishii and his co-workers are based on anonymous letters, hearsay 
affidavits, and rumors. The Legal Section interrogations, to date, of the numerous 
persons concerned with the BW project in China, do not reveal sufficient evidence to 
support war crimes charges." Carpenter stated that there were no pending charges against 
Ishii, although his superiors were defendants in the Tokyo Trial. Since evidence was not 
105 CINCFE (MacArthur) from Washington (JCS), 21 March 1947. MacArthur Memorial Archives, 
Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 2 "Radiograms 25 June 1946-17 November 1948." 
106 CINCFE (for Carpenter, Legal Section for Action) from WAR (WDSCA WO), 3 June 1947. 
MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 2 "Radiograms 25 June 
1946-17 November 1948." 
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sufficient to connect any of the defendants with Ishii's alleged bacteriological warfare 
activities, the IPS decided not to pursue the issue.107 
The United States did have evidence of Japan's chemical warfare, but withheld it 
from the court. Awaya believes that this decision was related to the United States' use of 
atomic bombs. He states: 
They [the American authorities] avoided it because, should they pursue the case 
concerning the Japanese army's poison gas warfare, it was highly probable that the 
defense would confute it by citing the American use of atomic bombs. In addition, the 
United States intended to conduct chemical warfare in later years, and was afraid of 
having its hands tied by setting a legal precedent against chemical warfare under 
international law at the Tokyo Trial. The United States abandoned the prosecution for 
this reason.108 
Awaya's speculation about the United States' intent to conduct chemical warfare in the 
future is noteworthy given the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
and subsequent American actions in the Vietnam War. Tensions between the United 
States and the USSR emerged immediately after World War II, and the American desire 
to prevent the Soviets from gaining information on Japanese wartime experiments makes 
Awaya's hypothesis plausible. The United States recognized Japan as a potential ally 
against the Russians. Master Sergeant Samuel B. Moody, a Bataan Death March and 
POW camp survivor, was the only American GI to testify at the Tokyo Trial about the 
Bataan Death March. After his testimony, he worked with the war crimes investigation 
division. In his memoir, Moody recounts a conversation he had with a Major Radcliffe 
after investigating suspected perpetrators at a factory in Nagoya. Radcliffe informed 
Moody that "what we really want, what General MacArthur wants, is for the Japs to learn 
107 War (WDSCA WC) from CINCFE (Carpenter, Legal Section, SCAP), 6 June 1947. MacArthur 
Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 2 "Radiograms 25 June 1946-17 
November 1948." 
108 Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 248-249. 
democracy. We may have to count on Japan as an ally some day.. .The Russians, that's 
our real enemy. They are building every minute. We're trying to forget the last war. 
They're busy getting ready for the next one."109 Radcliffe went on to explain to Moody 
that after the war the job of the United States was to rebuild Japan because "they won't 
bounce back unless we make a conscious effort to help them. And we have to, sergeant, 
we have to, if only to help ourselves."110 Radcliffe's statements support Awaya's 
hypothesis regarding the United States' plans for future warfare and help to explain the 
United States' actions concerning the information on Ishii's experiments. 
Justice Roling of the Netherlands commented on the bacteriological warfare 
cover-up in 1981. Roling stated, "it is a bitter experience for me to be informed now that 
centrally ordered Japanese war criminality of the most disgusting kind was kept secret 
from the Court by the U.S. government."111 The United States knew that Americans 
were among the victims of bacteriological warfare experiments, but felt that "the value to 
U.S. of Japanese BW data is of such importance to national security as to far outweigh 
I I ?  
the value accruing from war crimes prosecution." This decision went directly against 
the goal of the IMTFE since it granted immunity to men who committed what Justice 
Roling called "the gravest war crimes."113 The United States worried about the "remote 
possibility" that the Soviet Union might disclose evidence not only of the bacteriological 
experiments, but also of the American victims. The cover-up of these experiments and 
granting immunity to General Ishii and his men confirm the United States' primary 
109 Samuel B. Moody and Maury Allen, Reprieve from Hell (New York: Pageant Press, 1961), 205. 
110 Moody, Reprieve from Hell, 206. 
111 R. Gomer, "Japan's Biological Weapons: 1930-1945," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist 37 (October 
1981), 52. 
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interest in preparation for an expected war with the Soviet Union, rather than the goal of 
the IMTFE. Attention to emerging Cold War tensions triumphed over punishment for 
wartime atrocities. 
VERDICTS AND SENTENCES 
The trial proceeded much more slowly than anticipated, and the court did not 
adjourn until 16 April 1948, with verdicts and sentences delivered in November 1948. 
The judgment ran more than 1200 pages and it took President Webb eight days to read it 
aloud to the court.114 Much of the judgment summarized Japan's history and 
involvement in aggressive warfare against the Allied nations. The verdicts and sentences 
comprised only a small part of the document. The judges threw out the bulk of the 
charges against the defendants on the grounds of redundancy or lack of evidence. On the 
counts that remained, the defendants were charged as "leaders, organizers, instigators, or 
accomplices in the formulation of execution of a common plan or conspiracy to wage 
wars of aggression and wars in violation of international law," as well as waging 
unprovoked aggressive warfare against China and the various other Allied nations.115 
The eight counts for which the defendants were convicted fell into the Class A category 
concerning aggressive warfare, the main charge facing the accused as they were all 
chosen for trial based on their role in planning the war. All of the charges in Group Two, 
"Murder," were dropped. From Group Three in the indictment, crimes stood related to 
authorizing and/or permitting inhumane treatment of prisoners of war and the defendants 
114 John L. Ginn, Sugamo Prison Tokyo: An Account of the Trial and Sentencing ofJapanese War 
Criminals in 1948, by a U.S. Participant. (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1992), 55. 
115 Gabrieile Kirk McDonald and Olivia Swaak-Goldman, eds., Substantive and Procedural Aspects of 
International Crimianl Law: The Experience of International and National Courts, Volume III, Documents 
and Cases (The Hauge : Graham & Trotman Ltd., 2000), 751. 
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disregarding their responsibility to prevent war time atrocities.116 Although the 
defendants were not believed to have personally committed any wartime atrocities, 
several of them were found guilty of possessing knowledge of atrocities and failing to 
stop them, as was the case for General Matsui who was in charge during the Rape of 
Nanking, indicating that Class B and Class C war crimes were important. The conviction 
of Class A defendants for Class BC crimes also upheld the precedent set during the 
Yamashita trial in Manila and confirmed that wartime leaders were responsible for the 
actions of their subordinates. 
All of the twenty-five war criminals were found guilty of at least one charge. 
Seven defendants received the death sentence; sixteen faced life imprisonment. Only 
Togo and Shigemitsu received lesser sentences, 20 years and seven years in prison, 
respectively. The sentences lacked any discernible pattern (see Table 2 below.) Only 
two defendants were acquitted on Count 1, the charge for planning aggressive warfare. 
The seven sentenced to death were convicted of one of the conventional war crimes 
charges—either Count 54 or 55. Matsui, convicted only on Count 55 received the death 
penalty. Matsui's death sentence indicated that the Allies viewed conventional war 
crimes charges as one of the most serious charges in the indictment. He received the 
death sentence for a Class BC crime and was not charged with crimes against peace. In 
an example of the inconsistency of the sentences, other defendants who were convicted 
on Count 55 in addition to Class A crimes received lighter sentences. Even the other 
defendants convicted on the same counts did not receive the same sentence. Togo and 
Umezu, for example, were convicted of the same charges yet Togo received twenty years 
in prison while Umezu received a life sentence. 
116 Ginn, Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, 40, 136-137. 
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Count 1 27 29 31 32 33 35 36 54 55 Sen­
tence 
Araki G G NG NG NG NG NG NG NG NG Life 
Doihara G G G G G NG G G G X Death 
Hashimo­
to 
G G NG NG NG NI NI NI NG NG Life 
Hata G G G G G NI NG NG NG G Life 
Hiranuma G G G G G NG NG G NG NG Life 
Hirota G G NG NG NG NG NG NI NG G Death 
Hoshino G G G G G NG NG NI NG NG Life 
Itagaki G G G G G NG G G G X Death 
Kaya G G G G G NI NI NI NG NG Life 
Kido G G G G G NG NG NG NG NG Life 
Kimura G G G G G NI NI NI G G Death 
Koiso G G G G G NI NI NG NG G Life 
Matsui NG NG NG NG NG NI NG NG NG G Death 
Minami G G NG NG NG NI NI NI NG NG Life 
Muto G G G G G NG NI NG G G Death 
Oka G G G G G NI NI NI NG NG Life 
Oshima G NG NG NG NG NI NI NI NG NG Life 
Sato G G G G G NI NI NI NG NG Life 
Table 2: Verdicts and Sentences of Class A War Criminals 








NG G G G G G NG NI NG G 7 yrs. 
Shimada G G G G G NI NI NI NG NG Life 
Shiratori G NG NG NG NG NI NI NI NI NI Life 
Suzuki G G G G G NI NG NG NG NG Life 
Togo G G G G G NI NI NG NG NG 20 yrs. 
Tojo G G G G G G NI NG G X Death 
Umezu G G G G G NI NI NG NG NG Life 
Table 2 Continued 
Class A war crimes were the focus of the Tokyo Trial and so crimes against peace 
should have received the harshest sentences. The IMTFE Judgment supports the gravity 
of Count 1. It states "we have come to the conclusion that the charges of conspiracy to 
wage aggressive wars have been proven and that these charges are criminal in the highest 
degree."117 Six of the seven defendants who received death sentences were convicted of 
aggressive warfare and one of the Class BC charges, either Count 54 or 55. The seventh 
defendant to receive the death sentence, Matsui, was convicted only of Count 55, a 
crimes against humanity charge. If crimes against peace were considered the most 
grievous war crimes, it is curious that Matsui was sentenced to death for failing to control 
his troops in Nanking. Matusi's sentence seems to suggest that crimes against humanity 
117 IMTFE Judgment, 986. 
were just as important as crimes against peace, though the entire purpose of the tribunal 
stated otherwise. It is also possible that Matusi's death sentence was part of the re­
education of the public about Japan's wartime actions. Since the events in Nanking were 
well known, Matusi's sentence served as a warning against future atrocities. The other 
seventeen defendants who were convicted of crimes against peace received lesser 
sentences. 
Six of the seven defendants sentenced to death were military officials. Hirota, a 
former premier and foreign minister, the only civilian who received the death sentence, 
"took the fall for Japan's civilian leaders."118 Hirota's conviction caused an outcry from 
various factions. Keenan's assistant, Robert Donihi, defense attorney George Fumess, 
defendant Shigemitsu, and American defense attorney George Yamaoka all believed 
Hirota should have been acquitted or received a lesser sentence, considering his role as a 
civilian and his inability to control the military that essentially ran the government.119 
Togo, another civilian and the former foreign minister, was convicted on the same counts 
as General Umezu and General Suzuki, but he received a lesser sentence than the 
Generals. Why the sentences varied is unclear. Piccigallo suggests that the tribunal 
considered various peripheral factors in determining each defendant's guilt.120 These 
likely included the defendant's official position, his actions during the war, and his 
influence over military actions. 
After Webb delivered the verdicts and sentences, MacArthur had to review and 
approve them. On 24 November 1948 he approved the judgment after meeting with the 
Allied Council for Japan for recommendations. The United States, Soviet Union, Great 
118 Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, 381. 
119 Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, 384. 
120 Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 28. 
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Britain, China, New Zealand, and the Philippines recommended no changes. The French 
representative considered the death penalty unethical and argued that the Allies, based on 
their own actions, were not in position to take the moral high ground. The representative 
from India, on the basis of Webb's separate opinion, argued for commutation of the death 
sentences to life imprisonment. The Netherlands also recommended the commutation of 
several sentences, and the representatives from Canada and Australia supported a prison 
sentence for Hirota. Although there was disagreement between the officials, MacArthur 
1^1 
confirmed the sentences. The seven defendants, including Doihara and Hirota who 
were sentenced to death, appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The defendants 
argued that the IMTFE was essentially a tribunal of the United States and not an 
international tribunal. They claimed that MacArthur had overstepped his authority in 
creating the Tribunal, and therefore it was not international in nature. The issue centered 
on MacArthur's creation of the Tribunal, while in Nuremberg four powers created the 
Tribunal.122 The Supreme Court however, less than three weeks after agreeing to hear the 
argument rejected the idea and stated that the Tribunal was in fact international in nature 
since MacArthur represented the Allied powers, and therefore an American court had no 
authority to alter the judgment or sentences. With the sentences upheld, executions of the 
seven men condemned to death were carried out on 23 December 1948.123 The rest of the 
defendants remained in prison. 
Justice Rflling, in an interview in 1977, expressed his opinion on the execution of 
the sentences. Ruling suggested that MacArthur perhaps listened to American public 
opinion and attempted to please the American people by following through with the 
121 Boister and Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal, 262-263. 
122 Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, 398-399. 
123 Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 31-32. 
sentences. Ro ling's personal speculation was that MacArthur was ordered to uphold the 
majority judgment. For propaganda purposes, and to aid in the prevention of future 
aggressive wars, Washington might have ordered MacArthur to uphold the sentences. 
The American public may also have expected guilty verdicts and sentences for the 
leaders who had planned the attack on Pearl Harbor. Roling's opinion seems to be based 
on a statement made by MacArthur later to Shigemitsu. Retting quotes MacArthur telling 
Shigemitsu: "I was always convinced that you were innocent and that your 
condemnation was a mistake."124 Roling stated that the arguments MacArthur needed to 
commute Shigemitsu's sentence were in his dissenting opinion, though he did not believe 
MacArthur read his or any of the dissenting opinions, especially as he had approved the 
sentences very shortly after they were pronounced. People expected the "Supreme 
Commander who had established the Tribunal should accept its findings and 
judgment."125 MacArthur's adherence to the sentences is noteworthy, especially since 
the situation regarding Japan had changed by late 1948. Reduction of the sentences could 
have been a gesture of goodwill toward the Japanese. Perhaps the United States thought 
it inappropriate to show leniency toward any of Japan's major war criminals, and saved 
those acts for the Class BC trials. 
The inconsistency of the verdicts and sentences for the Tokyo defendants raises 
questions about the decisions. The Judgment did not offer any clues as to how the 
sentences were determined, although Webb did point out that no one at Nuremberg 
received the death penalty if they were convicted only of crimes against peace, and the 
124 ROling and Cassese, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond, 82. 
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same principle should be applied to the Japanese.126 Since the tribunal was convened 
specifically to try defendants for aggressive warfare, it would seem that Class A crimes 
would receive the harshest penalties. By only sentencing defendants who were convicted 
of conventional war crimes in addition to crimes against peace (except in the case of 
Matsui) the IMTFE did not seem to uphold the great importance of the Class A crime. 
Since most defendants convicted on Class A charges received prison sentences, the 
sentences overall indicate that conventional war crimes were in fact of great importance 
because only defendants convicted on those charges were sentenced to death. Planning 
for aggressive warfare alone was not enough to warrant the death penalty. 
DISSENTING OPINIONS 
Although the majority of the justices supported the judgment, several dissenting 
opinions were filed. These opinions were not presented to the court, but were included in 
the final record of the trial. Justice Pal, from India, dissented completely from the 
majority opinion.127 Justices Bernard (France) and Ruling (the Netherlands) partially 
dissented. Justices Jaranilla (Philippines) and Webb concurred, but submitted separate 
opinions reflecting their views on specific problems.128 The variety of opinions reflected 
the justices' personal beliefs, or disagreements with sentencing and procedural matters. 
The dissents and separate opinions reflected the difficulty in reaching agreements in 
international tribunals and point to the controversies associated with the Tokyo Trial. 
126 Horwitz, "The Tokyo Trial," 573. 
127 Pal's dissent was published in its entirety after the trial concluded. Totani also offers a thorough chapter 
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One of the biggest criticisms of the trial revolved around the idea of conspiracy. 
As Richard Minear points out, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity were 
"of highly uncertain status in international law."129 In order to try suspects for crimes 
against peace, the prosecution had to argue that certain international conventions such as 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact established the accountability of leaders for actions of their 
country in international law. Thus charges of conspiracy were included in the indictment. 
Defense lawyer Kenzo Takayanagi argued that conspiracy was a "peculiar product of 
English legal history."130 Although Minear criticized the Tokyo Trial, based on his 
vantage point from the Vietnam era, his emphasis on the legal debate reflects on the more 
important criticisms of the trial. The concept of conspiracy remains a contention that 
surrounds the Tokyo Trial. In this instance, Webb and Pal agreed with the critics and felt 
that the Tribunal did not have the authority to charge for conspiracy as it did not already 
exist under international law. The fact that two of the justices of the trial questioned the 
validity of their authority suggests that the Allies were not strict in their interpretation of 
law. A loose interpretation of international law and the idea of conspiracy allowed the 
tribunal to successfully carry out its responsibility to punish those responsible for waging 
aggressive warfare, even if there was no real precedent. A strict interpretation may have 
prevented the tribunal from trying the defendants, as the Class A trial required charges of 
crimes against peace. Minear also argues that the conspiracy charge allowed the 
prosecution to include a spectrum of defendants.131 The conspiracy charge enabled the 
Allies to arrest a large number of suspects, many of whom were held for the duration of 
the IMTFE but released without trial. 
129 Minear, Victors' Justice, 35. 
130 Minear, Victors' Justice, 12,40-41. 
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Minear states the conspiracy charge allowed for relaxed rules of evidence. The 
relaxed rules of evidence clause proved important in both Class A and Class BC trials, as 
the Japanese destroyed many official documents prior to the start of the war crimes 
investigations. Although the court acted as a model of western style justice systems and 
required sufficient evidence to convict a defendant, the relaxed rules of evidence made 
the prosecution's task easier and contributed to the ease with which the tribunal could 
reach guilty verdicts. 
Both Webb and Pal agreed that conspiracy was not a crime under international 
law. Webb stated: 
It may well be that a naked conspiracy to have recourse to war or to commit a 
conventional war crime or crime against humanity should be a crime, but this Tribunal is 
not to determine what ought to be law but what is the law. Where a crime is created by 
the International Law, this Tribunal may apply a rule of universal application to 
determine the range of criminal responsibility; but it has no authority to create a crime of 
naked conspiracy based on Anglo-American concepts; nor on what it perceives to be a 
common feature of the crime of conspiracy under the various national laws.133 
Pal also concluded that "conspiracy by itself was not yet a crime in international life."134 
One of the criticisms of the Tokyo Trial was that it was based on ex post facto law, and 
the defendants were charged with crimes that had not existed at the time they were 
committed. Webb's statement points out the difficulty in translating national legal 
concepts over into international law without clear precedents. Many of the issues 
included in the dissenting opinions, such as the questions over the conspiracy charge, 
mirrored objections made by the defense prior to and during the trial. 
Webb detailed his disagreement with the Tribunals' definition of conspiracy, 
arguing that the concept of conspiracy adopted had no grounds in international law, 
132 Minear, Victor's Justice, 28. 
133 Horwitz, "The Tokyo Trial," 554. 
134 Horwitz, "The Tokyo Trial," 554. 
although he recognized that it existed in Anglo-American law. He also disagreed with 
the punishments, citing the Nuremberg sentences as a precedent. In Nuremberg several 
war criminals convicted of plotting and waging aggressive warfare received life 
sentences. Webb urged the IMTFE to do the same. He consistently opposed the death 
penalty; the Tokyo Trial was the first time Webb had ever pronounced a death sentence 
in his twenty-three years on the bench. Webb's opinion was most sensational in his 
conjecture that Hirohito should have been charged as a war criminal.135 
Pal's agreement with Webb on the lack of precedent for conspiracy charges in an 
international court went further in his disagreement with all of the findings in the 
majority opinion and culminated in his dissent that called for the acquittal of each 
defendant on all charges. Rather than active conspiracy, Pal believed that Japan had been 
driven to its actions by threatening conditions elsewhere in the world, such as the rise of 
Communism in China and the Western nations' economic embargoes against Japan. In 
his opinion, Japan had been justified in initiating the war to protect itself.136 For the idea 
of crimes against peace to have been legitimate, Pal argued, all nations involved would 
have to be agree unanimously, and even the victor nations would need to be held 
responsible for their actions during the war.137 Maga mentions that Pal asked, in the 
name of fairness, that the Allied leaders also be tried or the Tokyo defendants found not 
guilty of planning aggressive warfare. This request was refused and Pal continued to 
claim the trial was "victor's justice."138 
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Pal also argued that Japan was not legally bound by the Fourth Hague Convention 
of 1907, the Prisoner of War Convention of 1929, or any other international agreements 
because not all signatories ratified the Fourth Hague Convention, and Japan agreed to 
comply with the Prisoner of War Convention only out of good will and was not legally 
bound to follow through.139 While Pal admitted that the Japanese had committed 
atrocities against civilians and prisoners of war, he did not think the Tokyo Trial dealt 
with the actual perpetrators of the crimes. Rather, the people actually responsible for war 
crimes were those at the lower levels, such as soldiers in the field or camp guards. Pal 
actually praised the work of the tribunals that oversaw the Class BC trials conducted by 
the various Allied nations and believed that they were right in holding war crimes trials 
because they focused on those who carried out the crimes. He argued that the Tokyo 
Tribunal should not have charged the defendants with conventional war crimes as the 
accused did not personally commit any atrocities.140 Pal's position supports the 
importance of the Class BC trials and their success in trying perpetrators who personally 
committed war crimes. It undermines the importance of Class A crimes against peace, 
which was the entire basis for the trial. If the defendants were not charged with Class A 
crimes, the Tokyo Tribunal had no jurisdiction. According to Pal's logic, the Tokyo 
tribunal should not have existed. The prosecution was able also to charge the defendants 
with Class BC crimes due to the indictment's wording and the range of time and scope of 
events it covered. The indictment focused most heavily on aggressive warfare. Since Pal 
believed the defendants were justified in their actions, were innocent of waging 
aggressive warfare, and were not personally responsible for committing Class B or Class 
139 Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 219-220. 
140 Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 219-220 and Maga, Judgment at Tokyo, 67-68. 
C crimes, he could argue that each defendant should have been acquitted. In the end, Pal 
was the only justice who did not sign the Tribunals' Judgment, indicating the depth of his 
conviction and severe opposition to the majority opinion. Justices Bernard and Roling 
signed only with the understanding that their separate opinions formed part of the 
record.141 
Justice Jaranilla, in his separate opinion, also disagreed with the sentences, but, 
unlike Pal, he felt that the Tribunal was not strict enough in its punishments. Jaranilla 
stated that "if any criticism should be made at all against this Tribunal, it is only that the 
Tribunal has acted with so much leniency in favor of the accused and has afforded them, 
through their counsel, all the opportunity to present any and all pertinent defenses they 
had, thus protracting the trial."142 Jaranilla raised no questions about precedents or 
international law, but focused on what he believed to be the lenient sentences. As a 
Bataan Death March survivor, perhaps he felt that the sentences should be harsher. The 
defense questioned Jaranilla's objectivity and feared his bias and asked that he be 
removed from the bench since he had "facts, of his own personal knowledge, which may 
creep into the case."143 After pointing out that the Tribunal did not have the authority to 
overturn Mac Arthur's appointments, Webb declared that the motion to remove Jaranilla 
from the bench did not present clear grounds for a challenge, and it was denied. 
The only other justice to call for stricter sentences for three of the defendants was 
Justice Roling. ROling thought that the Class A charges were comparable to political 
crimes in domestic law, and therefore in accordance with international law. R6ling did 
not oppose the death penalty for those accused of conventional war crimes, but he 
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disagreed with giving the death sentence to anyone convicted only of crimes against 
peace. Like Webb, he cited Nuremberg in his argument. Roling's opinion that only 
conventional war crimes merited the death penalty implies that the Class BC suspects had 
committed more severe crimes, since they deserved harsher punishment than those 
convicted of crimes against peace. Based on this view, Roling believed that Oka, Sato, 
and Shimada should have been found guilty of committing conventional war crimes and 
thus sentenced to death, although none of the three was found guilty of Counts 54 or 55, 
and each received life imprisonment. He agreed with six of the seven death sentences, 
and believed that Hirota, as a diplomat and a civilian, deserved an acquittal. In addition, 
ROling thought that four other defendants, Togo, Shigemitsu, Kido, and Hata, should also 
have been acquitted.144 
Justice Bernard's partial dissent focused on procedural issues. The French justice 
opposed the failure to conduct a pretrial inquiry. He concurred with the opinion that the 
prosecution had access to more resources than the defense, and therefore was at an 
advantage. Like Webb, Bernard also believed that Hirohito should have been tried as a 
war criminal.145 He thought the absence of the Emperor was "certainly detrimental to the 
defense of the Accused."146 Though he did not argue for any changes in the sentences, 
Bernard argued that inclusion of the Emperor in the trial might have helped the 
defendants, suggesting that perhaps he thought the outcome of the trial might have been 
different had the Emperor been indicted, or at least called as a witness for the defense. 
Finally, Bernard pointed out that the judges failed to deliberate aloud and jointly 
before reaching their individual decisions. He concluded that "a verdict reached by a 
144 Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 30. 
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Tribunal after a defective procedure cannot be a valid one."147 Again Bernard seems to 
suggest that the outcome of the trial might have been different had in his opinion fair and 
proper procedure been followed. 
The differences of opinion among the judges illustrate the underlying tensions 
surrounding the Tokyo Trial. Although justices should be free from bias, the dissenting 
opinions indicated that the eleven justices could not agree on some of the most important 
underlying principles or core issues, such as the idea of criminal conspiracy to commit 
aggressive war. The justices themselves raised questions about their authority. The 
Tokyo Trial only had jurisdiction if defendants were charged with crimes against peace in 
addition to conventional war crimes. The purpose of the IMTFE was to try leaders, not 
perpetrators. Though dissenting opinions are part of western style justice systems, the 
fact that the United States and seven other nations did not submit any further opinion or 
dissent while four of their Allies did raised questions about those nations' lack of concern 
with respect to trial procedure or international law. The four dissenting justices 
represented countries unconcerned with running a smooth Occupation, gaining 
information from experiments conducted by the Japanese, or in the case of the United 
States, in playing its new role in the postwar world. Instead, they focused on the aspects 
of the trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tokyo Trial demonstrated that the Americans were not working solely to 
punish Japanese war criminals but sought to ensure a successful Occupation that would 
result in a new, democratic Japan willing to ally with the United States against the USSR. 
147 Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 29. 
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The Class BC trials taking place in other areas throughout the Pacific punished war 
criminals. They also proved politically useful to the United States as mechanism with 
which the Japanese could learn democratic principles. Although the Class A trial received 
more attention, the Class BC trials proved to be just as important, if not more important 
than the Tokyo Trial. 
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CHAPTER III 
CLASS BC WAR CRIMES TRIALS: YOKOHAMA 
The Allies faced an enormous task in conducting the Pacific war crimes trials. 
Four percent of Allied POW's held by German forces died in captivity. The deaths of 
Allied POW's held by Japanese forces was almost seven times higher, at twenty-seven 
percent.1 The high percentage of POW deaths, in addition to crimes against civilians in 
Japanese occupied territory, resulted in over 2,200 Pacific trials with 5,700 defendants. 
Those numbers include only the defendants who were apprehended and tried, and not 
those suspects who escaped capture, committed suicide, or were released before they 
could be brought to trial. 
Most Class BC war crimes trials occurred between 1945 and 1951, and unlike the 
Tokyo Trial, the Class BC trials were conducted separately by the individual Allied 
nations. Each Allied nation created its own tribunal and ran it according to its own laws. 
In one of the few studies that focuses on the BC trials, Philip Piccigallo explains: 
Each nation, viewing the trials within its own domestic and international political, 
economic, and social context, outlined and followed, within practical limitations, its own 
war crimes policy. Put simply, Japanese war crimes trials did not to any great extent 
determine the course of any Allied nation's major policies; rather, major policies and 
relative factors determined the course of the trials in each nation. This is another way of 
saying that Japanese war crimes trials were made to fit into the overall national and 
foreign policy objective of each Allied country.2 
The Tokyo Trial may have been in the limelight due to its high profile 
defendants, but the bulk of the work in punishing war criminals was accomplished by the 
Class BC trials. The more numerous BC trials charged war criminals with committing 
1 Piccagallo, The Japanese on Trial, 209. 
2 Piccagallo, The Japanese on Trial, xiii. 
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atrocities, or for allowing and ordering crimes to be committed. The defendants 
represented a wide spectrum of Japanese society. They included soldiers, farmers, 
teachers, interpreters, priests, nurses, doctors, government officials, and college 
professors.4 The Tokyo defendants allowed, encouraged, or ordered war crimes, while the 
BC defendants were present where atrocities were committed and were often accused of 
having direct participation, ordering crimes to be committed, or having knowledge of 
crimes but failing to put a stop to the them. 
The United States tried criminals in three Pacific theater locations: Yokohama, 
Shanghai, and Guam. Trials initiated in Manila were soon turned over to the Philippine 
government. This chapter focuses on the United States' trials in Yokohama, the site of 
the majority of the Class BC trials overseen by the United States. 
Unlike the Tokyo Trial, the Class BC trials did not establish many precedents and 
attracted little attention outside of Japan.5 Yet the BC trials were more successful in 
punishing war criminals than the Class A trial, and they played a more important role in 
establishing the global politics as the American Occupation of Japan came to an end and 
the United States sought to secure a stable ally against Communism in Asia. 
DELEGATION OF POWER FOR CLASS BC TRIBUNALS: YOKOHAMA 
The bulk of the American Pacific war crimes trials were held from 1945 to 1949. 
Of the 474 Class BC cases tried by Americans, 319 of those trials were conducted at 
3 Piccagallo, The Japanese on Trial, xiv. 
4 Piccagallo, The Japanese on Trial, 83-84. 
5 For this perspective, see John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1999), 443-444. For an explanation of the Command responsibility 
precedent set by the lesser trials, see Richard L. Lael, The Yamashita Precedent: War Crimes and 
Command Responsibility (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1982). 
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Yokohama. The war crimes proceedings at Yokohama included 372 cases, though only 
319 came to trial. 
The Yokohama commissions were more international than the tribunals 
conducted by the other Allied nations due to the fact that they were connected to SCAP. 
Other trials did not receive their authority from Mac Arthur. The Yokohama commissions 
were appointed through the regular army channels by SCAP, who represented all the 
occupying nations.6 These commissions, appointed on a case by case basis, could include 
representatives of several nations, appointed to try cases involving crimes against one or 
multiple nations,7 supporting Piccagallo's claim that the Yokohama trials were more 
international in nature. The Commanding General, Eight Army also viewed the 
proceedings from an international aspect because he, and the reviewing authority, were 
created by SCAP and not United States functionaries.8 Granting army authorities the 
ability to appoint judges further demonstrated the commitment of the United States to 
cooperate with its Allies. 
On 5 December 1945, MacArthur granted Lt. General Robert L. Eichelberger, the 
commanding general of the US Eighth Army at Yokohama, the authority to create 
military commissions for the BC war crimes trials. A lengthy memo to Eichelberger 
detailed the rules and regulations concerning the Class BC war crimes trials. The 
directive from MacArthur allowed Eichelberger to appoint judges from any Allied nation 
to the military commission. 
6 Piccagallo, The Japanese on Trial, 83. 
7 Commanding General, Eighth Army, APO 343 from General MacArthur, 5 December 1945. War Crimes 
Information: Copies of Orders, Directives, and Other Memoranda Pertaining to Establishment, 
Administration, and Prosecution of War Criminals in Japan and the Philippines, United States?: s.n., 1946. 
8 Paul E. Spurlock, "The Yokohama War Crimes Trials: The Truth About a Misunderstood Subject," 
American Bar Association Journal 26 (May 1950): 437. 
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The memo granted the military commission's jurisdiction over Class A, B, and C 
war crimes. While the commissions did have the authority to try war criminals as Class 
A offenders, none of the trials at Yokohama charged defendants with crimes against 
peace.9 Each commission had at least three members, and unlike the Tokyo Trial, in each 
case alternates were appointed. Members could be service personnel in the Army or 
Navy, or qualified civilians. A "specially qualified" member of the commission would 
be designated as the law member, similar to the President at the Tokyo Tribunal. The law 
member had the final say in rulings on the admissibility of evidence. 
The document also stated appointees should not be biased by personal interest or 
prejudice, and no appointments would be made of individuals who personally 
investigated a case or were needed as a witness.10 This was an early contention made by 
the defense in the Tokyo Trial, when it was discovered that Justice Jaranilla from the 
Philippines was a survivor of the Bataan Death March. The IMTFE ruled that his 
experience did not bias him, and he was allowed to sit on the bench. By including the 
statement against personal bias or prejudice in tribunal appointments, the Class BC trials 
avoided much of the controversy and criticism surrounding the Class A trial. The BC 
commissions followed a more stringent set of regulations than the IMTFE. The first trial 
at Yokohama, against Tatsuo Tsuchiya, or "Little Glass Eye" in December 1945 allowed 
the military commission to put into practice its commitment to avoid bias. In the case of 
Tsuchiya, Colonel Joseph H. Ball was relieved of duty as a member of the military 
commission when the defense for Tsuchiya objected after learning that Ball was captured 
9 Commanding General, Eighth Army, from General MacArthur, 5 December 1945. War Crimes 
Information. 
10 Commanding General, Eighth Army, from General MacArthur, 5 December 1945. War Crimes 
Information. 
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in the Philippines, survived the Bataan Death March, and spent three years in a Japanese 
POW camp. Ball stated that he "believed himself to be unprejudiced except in so far as 
incidents that he himself witnessed."11 However, terse responses to further questioning 
case a doubt on his ability to be impartial and Ball was removed from the bench. This 
attempt to eliminate possible prejudice provided Tsuchiya a commission that held no bias 
10 
based on wartime experiences. 
The memo detailed the trial procedure, providing nine steps, from reading the 
charges and specifications aloud in open court to the commission considering the case in 
closed session before announcing the judgment and sentence.13 An additional document 
regarding trial proceedings supplemented the 5 December 1945 memo and essentially 
provided a script for the trials. Since commission members changed on a case by case 
basis, these guidelines ensured that each defendant faced common standards in trials 
before a commission at Yokohama. The guidelines began with the procedure for the 
commission members' entrance into the courtroom, continued with the swearing in of 
court officials, reading of charges, opening statements, questioning of witnesses, and 
ended with the closing of the commission for discussion and reading of the verdict.14 The 
guidelines also limited the possibility of controversy regarding court policies and 
proceedings since each defendant was subject to the same procedure. They ensured that 
each trial demonstrated the democratic practices that the United States was determined to 
convey to the Japanese for their country's rebuilding. The final section in the 5 
11 Lindesay Parrott, "Japanese Crime Court Drops U.S. Officer," New York Times, December 19, 1945. 
12 Lindesay Parrott, "Japanese Crime Court Drops U.S. Officer," New York Times, December 19, 1945. 
13 Commanding General, Eighth Army, from General MacArthur, 5 December 1945. War Crimes 
Information. 
14 Outline of Procedure for Trial of Accused War Criminals, War Crimes Information: Copies of Orders, 
Directives, and Other Memoranda Pertaining to Establishment, Administration, and Prosecution of War 
Criminals in Japan and the Philippines, United States?: s.n., 1946. 
72 
December 1945 memo granted the commissions permission to determine the most 
beneficial rules to complete their task, as long as they were not inconsistent with the rules 
set by SCAP.15 This paragraph allows some leeway to determine trial procedure, as long 
as decisions did not deviate substantially from SCAP orders. 
Just as the IMTFE sentences were subject to MacArthur's review before their 
execution, the Class BC trial sentences were also subject to review. The memo provides 
more detail than the IMTFE Charter regarding sentences. The commission was granted 
authority to sentence defendants to death, prison sentences, fines, or any other 
punishments the committee deemed appropriate. All sentences were reviewed by the 
officer appointed to the commission, who had the ability, like MacArthur in the Class A 
trial, to approve, suspend, or reduce the sentences but not to increase their severity.16 
Allowing the commanding officer of the US Eighth Army to review sentences of the 
Class BC trials lightened MacArthur's workload. MacArthur only had to step in directly 
where the accused was sentenced to death. 
TRIBUNAL RULINGS, EVIDENCE, AND TRIAL PROCEDURES 
Rulings were determined by a majority vote. No less than two thirds of the 
commission members had to be present for the vote. The commission was urged to 
"confine each trial strictly to a fair, expeditious hearing on the issues raised by the 
charges, excluding irrelevant issues or evidence and preventing any unnecessary delay or 
interference." Most trials at Yokohama lasted several days or weeks. One trial lasted 
15 Commanding General, Eighth Army, from General MacArthur. 5 December 1945, War Crimes 
Information. 
16 Commanding General, Eighth Army, from General MacArthur. 5 December 1945, War Crimes 
Information. 
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only one day. In order to expedite the trials, the Class BC memo, like the IMTFE 
Charter, relaxed the rules of evidence stating that "the commission shall apply the rules 
of evidence and pleading set forth herein with the greatest liberality to achieve 
expeditious procedure."17 A major problem arose when the United States demanded 
official military documents. The Japanese had destroyed as many official records as 
possible to hide evidence of war crimes making the relaxed rules of evidence necessary. 
Purposeful destruction of official documents also indicated the Japanese were aware and 
fearful of the criminality of their actions and cognizant of the confirmation of their 
actions that the records would provide to the occupying authorities. 
Evidence was to be admitted if, in the opinion of the commission, it "would be of 
assistance in proving or disproving the charge, or such as in the commission's opinion 
would have probative value in the mind of a reasonable man."18 The memo contained 
criteria similar to what the IMTFE Charter would later adopt. Evidence included 
documents issued by the government or International Red Cross, affidavits, depositions, 
diaries, letters, copies of documents, as well as sworn or unsworn statements that 
appeared to contain relevant information.19 During the first trial at Yokohama, that of 
Tatsuo Tsuchiya, the defense argued against allowing affidavits into evidence. Members 
of the commission overruled the objection, stating "the protection of the United States 
Constitution and Articles of War was not available to the accused as a Japanese citizen 
and a former belligerent."20 The defense argued that affidavits did not allow the suspect 
17 Commanding General, Eighth Army, from General MacArthur, 5 December 1945. War Crimes 
Information. 
18 Commanding General, Eighth Army, from General MacArthur, 5 December 1945. War Crimes 
Information. 
19 Commanding General, Eighth Army, from General MacArthur, 5 December 1945. War Crimes 
Information. 
20 Spurlock, "The Yokohama War Crimes Trials," 389. 
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to face his accuser in court, a right guaranteed to defendants in a US court of law. Likely, 
cost, time, and the number of potential witnesses led the commission to deny the 
defendant the right to face his accuser. Many Allied prisoners had returned home by the 
time the trials began and the cost to transport witnesses to Yokohama would have been 
very high. 
The memo also allowed for the introduction of evidence from a previous trial if 
the accused was charged in a crime involving a military unit or other organization. This 
was especially important in the Class BC trials because of the high number of suspects 
charged with Class BC crimes and the possibility of trying suspects in multiple cases. 
The judgment of previous trials when the defendants were part of the same group would 
also "be given full faith and credit" in subsequent trials.21 This decision suggested the 
United States' haste to get through the war crimes trials process. The desire to move on 
to other, seemingly more pressing issues, such as the signing of a peace treaty with Japan, 
may have influenced the agenda. Educating the Japanese people on the actions of their 
government and military may also have been a factor in the rapid preparation for the 
trials, since most civilians were unaware of wartime atrocities. By showing the Japanese 
the conduct of their country during war, the United States may have hoped that they 
would be more willing to follow democratic ways, or at least comply with US demands. 
The defense was aware of the relaxed rules of evidence, but in some cases the 
American defense lawyers still objected to the use of affidavits. In case number 51 
Yasushi Kimura, who served as a civilian guard in a POW camp, was charged on ten 
counts of abusing American POWs. No POWs testified at his trial, but some submitted 
21 Commanding General, Eighth Army, from General MacArthur, 5 December 1945. War Crimes 
Information. 
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testimony through affidavits. Kimura's defense lawyer submitted a general objection to 
all affidavits on the grounds that the defendant did not have the occasion to cross 
examine the person who submitted the affidavit. The commission overruled the objection 
and the defense then made specific objections to statements in the affidavits, some of 
which were sustained. In several instances, the prosecution and defense lawyers worked 
together to reach agreement on which statements should be stricken. The affidavit of 
William Rudolph Leibold presented several such opportunities. The defense and 
prosecution agreed that paragraphs one and two of the affidavit should be omitted since 
they did not mention the defendant specifically and only gave a general overview of 
Leibold's personal experience during the war. The prosecution agreed to remove several 
other paragraphs described as irrelevant, decisions sustained by the commission. In 
Kimura's case, members of the commission took into consideration what was best for the 
defendant. The defense proved that one witness called by the prosecution personally did 
not like the suspect. While a commission member attempted to find out whether there 
was any "malicious or spiteful feeling" on the part of the witness against the accused, the 
defense successfully objected on the grounds that the witness's reasons for not liking the 
defendant had no bearing on the war crimes case.23 Although the witnesses' personal 
feelings about the defendant were not relevant to the case, allowing the expression of 
those feelings in court may have influenced the commission members. 
The evidence section also stated, "all purported confessions or statements of the 
accused shall be admissible without prior proof that they were voluntarily given, it being 
for the commission to determine only the truth or falsity of such confessions or 
22 United States vs. Yasushi Kimura, Case Docket No. 51, Record Group 331, Box 9499, War Crimes 
Division Record of Trial File, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland. 
23 United States vs. Yasushi Kimura, Case Docket No. 51, NARA College Park. 
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statements."24 This statement raises questions about the manner in which confessions 
were obtained, although the directive included no information regarding this practice. 
LEGAL SECTION AND WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATION 
Although there was a considerable delay before the Class A trial in Tokyo, the 
Class BC trials in Yokohama began quickly once the institutional framework was in 
place. MacArthur oversaw the war crimes trials and the Legal Section. In order to 
investigate and prosecute war criminals, a special staff section of General Headquarters 
SCAP was created. Several predecessors to Legal Section existed. The War Crimes 
Office of the US War Department was established on 7 October 1944, and the Judge 
Advocate's Office opened a War Crimes Branch in the Pacific in April 1945. Two 
months later, a War Crimes Investigation Detachment opened in Manila. These offices 
investigated reports of war crimes and assisted with evidence collection.25 In October 
1945, these offices were turned into the Legal Section and took over the prosecution of 
war criminals. Colonel Alva C. Carpenter was appointed Section Chief. It was his 
responsibility to advise MacArthur on "general policies and procedures with respect to 
war crimes in categories other than the international aspect," or Class BC crimes, as well 
I f *  
as general policies regarding occupation courts and general legal matters. The Legal 
Section had many responsibilities regarding war crimes, including the investigation of 
24 Commanding General, Eighth Army, from General MacArthur, 5 December 1945. War Crimes 
Information. 
23 Trials of B and C Class Japanese War Criminals, Tokio [sic] (New South Wales: James McClelland 
Research), 41. 
26 SCAP, General Orders, 9 December 1945. War Crimes Information: Copies of Orders, Directives, and 
Other Memoranda Pertaining to Establishment, Administration, and Prosecution of War Criminals in 
Japan and the Philippines, United States?: s.n., 1946. 
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crimes, preparing cases of alleged war criminals, and maintaining a central registry of all 
Japanese war criminals and suspects.27 
In order to carry out its responsibilities, the Legal Section was authorized to create 
functional divisions. These included Prosecution, Investigation, Law, Criminal Registry 
and Administration, Control, Public Relations, and Liaison. Since the Class BC trials 
were daunting the divisions narrowed the focus of those employed in each department. 
Prosecution, composed of mostly attorneys, was assigned specific cases to prepare. 
Investigation prepared information required for successful prosecution. The Criminal 
Registry maintained the records of war crimes in the Pacific. The Liaison Office served 
as the link between the Japanese government and Legal Section. Liaison transmitted 
demands for documents and other information to the Japanese government on topics such 
as POW camps and processed their replies. The Legal Section required constant access 
to Japanese military records, controlled by various Japanese Ministries. Liaison routinely 
interacted with the Ministries. However, due to the nature of the Occupation, Liaison, as 
well as Legal Section, did not always trust nor get along with the Ministries. 
Demobilization Ministries, run by the Japanese, controlled the Japanese government, and 
SCAP guided the direction of the demobilization. However, since the Japanese were still 
essentially running the government, people who had perhaps committed atrocities 
continued to work in the Ministries and some were suspected of hampering the 
investigations.29 Even taking into account the loss of military records and the occasional 
27 SCAP, General Orders, 9 December 1945. War Crimes Information. 
28 William R. Gill, "War Crimes Investigations in Japan 1945-1948: A Personal Remembrance," Self 
published 1995,28. 
Gill, "War Crimes Investigations in Japan," 26-30. 
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deception, Legal Section still succeeded in finding evidence of multiple atrocities and in 
trying hundreds of suspected war criminals on Class BC charges. 
The Japanese had been warned several times prior to the end of the war that war 
criminals would be punished. As soon as the Japanese surrendered, preparation for the 
trials began. The day Japan surrendered, the government was ordered to provide 
complete information on the location of POW camps and the names of all Allied POWs 
and civilian prisoners in the camps. To deal with the enormous task of investigating war 
crimes and preparing cases for trial, Japan was divided into seven districts, which 
paralleled the Japanese army areas. In November 1945, they were ordered to provide a 
list of the complete chain of command from the Minister of War to camp commanders. 
They were again ordered to provide rosters of all POWs held in camps in Japan and the 
Philippines, a list of those who died in the camps, and a roster of all camp personnel, both 
civilian and military.30 
The Japanese government admitted in November 1945 that they destroyed records 
of over 30,000 POWs. The government blamed War Minister Korechika Anami, and 
stated that the first order to destroy documents was given on 15 August 1945. The Allies 
demanded a list of all destroyed records and were told this could not be provided. Anami 
had hoped to conceal the fate of mistreated or murdered POWs. In some instances false 
reports were prepared to hide the details of especially gruesome cases. The 
Demobilization Ministries provided reports on ninety-four POW camps. Cross checking 
statements taken from prisoners during liberation against the list of camps provided by 
the Japanese government, Legal Section realized that the location of all POW camps had 
not been reported by the Japanese government. Allied investigators located an additional 
30 Trials of B and C Class Japanese War Criminals, 45. 
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thirty-three.31 These discoveries testified to the scale of deliberate deception by the 
Japanese government. Legal Section dispatched teams to find the unreported camps. 
Second Lieutenant William Gill, later promoted to Captain, was part of the Investigation 
Division for Legal Section in Japan. In December 1945, Gill, and his Nisei interpreter 
Byron Yoshino were part of an investigation team sent to search for unreported POW 
camps on Hokkaido, Japan's northernmost island. Gill and Yoshino assessed the 
conditions at each camp and documented their findings. They also searched 
unsuccessfully for records or other documents that might be useful in war crimes trials. 
Gill described the process as frustrating, but stated that he and Yoshino were able to 
identify several camp personnel suspected of mistreating POWs. Gill's experience with 
one of the suspects, a factory supervisor, demonstrates that the Japanese did follow orders 
to destroy records in order to cover up war crimes. The suspect freely admitted he had 
burned POW records, and after Gill pressed the issue, insisting that the supervisor 
perhaps missed some records, the suspect replied "he did a good job at what he was told 
to do."32 Aware of the atrocities committed during the war, Gill worked to find the 
evidence to bring perpetrators to trial. However, since the United States was determined 
to model democratic principles and required evidence of crimes, Gill realized that many 
war criminals would escape punishment. He realized that it was "only winners, who 
occupied a territory and physically held the offending personnel and their assets, that had 
the power to determine what enemy actions would, or would not be prosecuted as war 
crimes."33 His critique helps to explain why the United States hesitated to hold trials for 
bacteriological warfare experiments. In 1947 Gill was sent to investigate experiments 
31 Trials of B and C Class Japanese War Criminals, 46-47. 
32 Gill, "War Crimes Investigations in Japan," 33-34. 
33 Gill, "War Crimes Investigations in Japan," 3-4. (Italics in original.) 
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conducted by Unit 731 in Manchuria. After a lengthy investigation, Gill "was ordered to 
stop the investigation and forget the entire affair, because the information was classified 
as top secret intelligence instead of war crimes."34 The requirements for evidence to 
prosecute suspected war criminals and the knowledge that where evidence did exist, other 
war criminals received clemency created a difficult task for investigators. Gill and 
Yoshino did contribute to the war crimes effort by uncovering evidence used in the trials, 
but wished they could have done more to help the victims. Given the number of records 
destroyed, the frustration in searching for evidence to assist the prosecution is easy to 
imagine. Gill dedicated his memoir to "those Prisoners of War in Japan, for whom we 
came too late—we were so very sorry."35 
The war crimes were grouped by type including POW cases, ship transport cases, 
Kempei Tai cases, airmen cases, and medical cases. Crimes that did not fit into any of 
these categories were assigned to a miscellaneous grouping.36 The Investigation Division 
then worked to find evidence to support the prosecution teams. In 1946, Gill was 
assigned as the investigations area supervisor of cases involving airmen. Of the 2,700 
investigations handled by the Investigation Division, 1,000 involved airmen. These cases 
were prominent because airmen were often the victims of brutal treatment in POW 
camps. Many were summarily executed. Japanese actions against airmen stemmed from 
the Doolittle raid in April of 1942. After the raid, the Japanese Army issued the Enemy 
Airman's Act of 1942, which permitted the Japanese to try airmen and hand out death 
sentences. These "trials" did not afford the airmen a defense. Often, they were 
conducted in Japanese with no translations, and they usually resulted in the beheading of 
34 Gill, "War Crimes Investigations in Japan," 51-52. (Italics in original.) 
35 Gill, "War Crimes Investigations in Japan," v. 
36 Trials of B and C Class Japanese War Criminals, 52. 
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the "defendant."37 The treatment of Allied airmen POWs by the Japanese certainly did 
not adhere to international regulations governing the treatment of POWs. The US hoped 
that the actions of the Investigation Division provided a contrast, and demonstrated that 
democratic countries did not summarily execute prisoners but rather relied on evidence 
and proper proceedings. The US provided defendants translations of all court 
proceedings. Each suspect was provided with a defense, and evidence was required to 
support accusations. In the Class BC trials, the United States provided Japanese suspects 
with rights denied to the captured Allied airmen, demonstrating United States' justice and 
showcasing Japanese brutality and forcing the Japanese to bend to America's will. 
The airmen's cases illustrated the overwhelming amount of work facing the 
Investigation Division and Legal Section. In order to reduce the workload, the 
Americans decided to treat all crew members from a downed or missing aircraft as one 
group, rather than view each airman as a separate case. This greatly reduced the overlap 
in investigations as shown in Table 3. By October 1947, 1,000 investigations involving 
airmen had been reduced to 475. Investigations of the other categories of war crimes 
were considerably fewer. Only the miscellaneous category had a higher number of 
investigations than the airmen, with 846 active investigations. Even with the 
consolidation of the cases, the number of investigations of crimes against downed airmen 
still made up a high percentage of investigations as compared to other types of atrocities. 
The high number of airmen cases could also suggest that the cases were the most 
traceable, since the names of crew on downed planes were easily obtained. The brutality 
37 Gill, "War Crimes Investigations in Japan," 41. 
38 Gill, "War Crimes Investigations in Japan," 45. 
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shown towards Allied airmen may have also contributed to more sensational and highly 
publicized cases, leading to a greater push to convict those suspected of these crimes. 
Type of War Crime Number of Active Investigations 
(October 1947) 
Airmen 475 (reduced from 1,000) 
POW Camp Conditions 7 
POW Atrocities 111 
POW Ships 28 
Kempei Tai 31 
Miscellaneous 846 
Table 3: Active War Crimes Investigations 
THE REVIEW PROCESS 
Suspects under investigation were held at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, the same prison 
that held the Class A defendants. Sugamo housed approximately 2000 indicted persons 
and protected witnesses. The United States, following its plan to model a democratic 
society for the Japanese, released many of the suspects due to lack of evidence. The 
release of prisoners showed leniency on the part of the United States, and also underlined 
its superiority, since the processing and release of prisoners implied the United States had 
time to investigate all suspects and did not simply rush them through show trials. 
Releasing prisoners without indictment may also have served as a method of 
intimidation, since only a strong country could decide to release suspects without trial. 
Approximately 1,000 of the suspects went through trials at Yokohama. The majority was 
Class C criminals. Approximately thirty were charged with Class B crimes.39 Of all the 
39 Ginn, Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, 33-34, 56. 
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investigations conducted by Legal Section, 371 were prepared for trial. With acquittals, 
319 made it to military commissions at Yokohama. 
To ensure that the Class BC trials were taken seriously and not rushed through to 
punish defendants or extract revenge, a thorough review process was applied in each 
case. The cases were reviewed by the Office of the Judge Advocate General, Eighth 
Army, and only cases resulting in the death penalty made it to MacArthur's desk. The 
lengthy review process aimed to eliminate legal errors that may have allowed for 
prejudice to be introduced. The review process ensured each defendant's rights were 
protected. By following this process, the military commissions demonstrated fair legal 
proceedings, and they also avoided potential controversies by allowing the defendants 
legal rights and review. The process made it more difficult to accuse the United States of 
conducting unfair show trials, a charge often associated with the Tokyo Trial. 
For each trial, the reviewer wrote a synopsis, as well as an opinion and a 
recommendation to approve or disapprove the commission's ruling.40 Paul Spurlock, a 
member of the Review Branch, described the diligence with which the cases were 
reviewed. "Just as in civil courts where some judges have a reputation for being '"hard"' 
'and others for being '"easy,"' so have there been some commissions whose sentences 
have been more severe than others."41 Spurlock described the review process which took 
steps to avoid criticisms and ensure fair punishments of BC criminals. The Review 
Branch made sure the SCAP rules were followed, and, considered adherence to the rules 
of land warfare, the principles of international law, and any other relevant legal 
precedents. Reviewers discussed their cases with each other, carefully weighing any 
40 Ginn, Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, 56-57. 
41 Spurlock, "The Yokohama War Crimes Trials," 389. 
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suggestions, before turning their synopsis, opinion, and recommendation over to the 
Chief Reviewer. The Chief Reviewer checked the information and forwarded it to the 
Judge Advocate, Eighth Army. The Judge Advocate made his own detailed study of each 
case and added his own suggestions. If he did not agree with the recommendation of the 
reviewer, he added his opinion and alternative action sheets to the review. Finally, the 
review was forwarded for the Commanding General, Eighth Army, for a final decision. 
The Commanding General required the Judge Advocate to answer eleven questions 
designed to ensure that each defendant received the same considerations. The questions, 
organized into four areas, covered the guilt of the accused, the fairness of the trial, the 
sentence and issues of clemency, and the sanity of the suspect at the time of the trial and 
alleged offenses. The Commanding General then rendered his opinion. If he approved a 
death sentence, the review was sent to the Theater Judge Advocate in Tokyo for 
additional review before being sent to Mac Arthur.42 
Each of the 319 cases tried at Yokohama went through this thorough process, 
which resulted in a number of sentence reductions by Eighth Army Commanding General 
Lt. Gen. Eichelberger and later Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker. According to Spurlock, 
recommendations for reductions of prison sentences were suggested in cases in which the 
reviewer found no evidence to support the specifics of guilty verdicts, or where the 
sentence was believed to be excessive.43 In some instances, death sentences were 
commuted to life in prison or hard labor. Of the 119 death penalty verdicts, seventy 
sentences were eventually commuted.44 In instances where the Judge Advocate felt the 
sentence was inadequate, nothing could be done since the regulations stipulated that the 
42 Spurlock, "The Yokohama War Crimes Trials," 436-437. 
43 Spurlock, "The Yokoyama War Crimes Trials," 437. 
44 Ginn, Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, 140. 
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severity of sentences could not be increased. The trial of Isojiro Okazaki, Yokohama 
case number 48, presented such a situation. Okazaki, charged with willfully and 
unlawfully beating and mistreating POWs by slapping and beating them with his fists, 
belt, and shoes, was sentenced to two years hard labor. Okazaki pleaded guilty to the two 
specifications, stating that he struck the POWs in anger. Sufficient evidence supported 
the case, and the defendant was found sane at the time of the trial. The Judge Advocate 
found the sentence inadequate stating, "it is not a sentence which is consonant with the 
requirements of justice."45 In this instance, the review process could not result in a 
change of the sentence, but it did show that the United States followed the regulations it 
created for the military commissions. It also protected Okazaki from receiving a more 
severe sentence because the Judge Advocate personally felt that the sentence was too 
light. Kimura's case also resulted in a conviction that Eichelberger found to be 
inadequate. The Commission found Kimura guilty on nine of ten counts, and sentenced 
him to five years hard labor. In his review statement, Eichelberger said "the sentence is 
inadequate for the offenses of which the accused was found guilty. However, in order 
that the accused may not escape punishment, the sentence is approved and will be duly 
executed."46 Again, the review process protected the defendant from receiving a harsher 
sentence based on one person's opinion. 
At the time Spurlock's article was published in May 1950, he stated that the War 
Crimes Division of the Judge Advocate section of the Eighth Army was "making a 
complete study of all the cases tried to date by the commissions, with the view of 
45 Okazaki, Isojiro, Case Synopses from Judge Advocate's Reviews, Yokohama Class B and C War Crimes 
Trials. 
http://socrates.berkelev.edU/~warcrime/Japan/Yokohama/Reviews/Yokohama Review Okazaki.htm 
(accessed 17 January 2012). 
46 United States vs. Yasushi Kimura. 
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equalizing by reduction of the sentences of some of the early cases that are unduly severe 
by comparison with those of the later cases."47 Presumably, cases that occurred later in 
the process had the benefit of a time lapse which allowed for initial anger to cool, 
resulting in lighter sentencing in later trials. Recognizing this phenomenon, the United 
States took steps to ensure that it accounted for any bias in the earlier trials by reducing 
earlier sentences where appropriate. This action again proved fairness as well as leniency 
towards former belligerents, and ultimately provided an example of a democratic people 
A O  
protecting the rights of others to fair trials. 
VERDICTS AND SENTENCES 
In 319 cases at Yokohama, 996 defendants were tried, with 854 convictions, a 
conviction rate of 86%, although the thorough review process altered some of the 
sentences. Like the Tokyo Trials, the Class BC verdicts and sentences did not seem to 
follow a pattern, other than the tendency for commissions to award harsher sentences 
more frequently in the earlier trials. 
The verdicts and sentences of the Class BC prisoners brings up the one major 
criticism of the Yokohama trials. Given the number of suspects, and the overlap in 
accusations and evidence, common trials were introduced at Yokohama. The United 
States was not the only ally to hold common trials, but the number of defendants tried 
simultaneously was often three to twelve and could rise to fifteen to twenty. In one 
instance, forty-six defendants faced trial together. Expedited mass trials prevented 
47 Spurlock, "The Yokohama War Crimes Trials," 437. 
48 Spurlock, "The Yokohama War Crimes Trials," 437. 
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military commissions from having to re-hear evidence.49 A mass trial saw the highest 
number of death sentences awarded at Yokohama. In case number 258, forty six 
defendants were tried and forty-one received death sentences. After the review process, 
most were commuted to prison terms. Only seven of the forty-one were executed. 
Although critics argued that mass trials were unfair, defendants involved in mass 
trials were more likely to be acquitted than those who stood trial alone. Larger mass 
trials were more common in later cases, as were acquittals. In the first 160 trials, only 
nine defendants were acquitted. In the remaining trials, many of which were common 
trials, 122 acquittals were handed down. Case number 339 saw twenty-six of forty-four 
defendants acquitted.50 The start of mass trials in Yokohama beginning in February 1946 
indicated that early on the United States decided that to create peace with Japan, the war 
crimes trials would need to end. Seeing the common trials as necessary Piccigallo stated: 
SCAP and state department officials discerned relatively early that only through 
expedition of the trials might they ever hope to dispose of their enormous burden within a 
reasonable time, and thereupon dedicate themselves to concluding a workable, non-
punitive peace treaty with Japan.51 
While it was important to punish war criminals, the peace treaty with Japan and threat of 
Communism in East Asia were the foremost concern of the United States. Understanding 
that the war crimes trials needed to end prior to signing a peace treaty, the United States 
used mass trials to expedite the process so it could focus on securing Japan as an ally. 
As the site of the largest number of war crimes trials conducted by Americans, 
Yokohama was central for the United States in accomplishing its goal of punishing 
Japanese war criminals. It also demonstrated that the United States was not simply out 
49 Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 86. 
50 Ginn, Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, 141-175. 
51 Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 95. 
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for revenge, as evidenced by the relatively low number of death sentences that were 
handed down and the even smaller number that were actually carried out, as shown in 
Table 4 below. 
Number of cases tried at Yokohama 319 
Number of defendants 996 
Convictions 854 
Acquittals 142 
Death sentences handed out 124 
Death sentences carried out 51 
Life Imprisonment 63 
41 to 50 years 2 
31 to 40 years 32 
21 to 30 years 80 
16 to 20 years 65 
11 to 15 years 92 
6 to 10 years 141 
5 years or less 255 
Table 4: Yokohama War Crimes Trials Sentences 
The sentences also prove that, unlike at the Tokyo Trial, defendants were not 
chosen because their chances of acquittal were slim. Defendants in the Class BC trials 
were acquitted and their sentences were reduced, neither of which happened for the 
Tokyo defendants. The more rigorous review process, the stricter guidelines, and the 
focus on actual perpetrators of atrocities made the Class BC trials much more successful 
than the Tokyo Trial in accomplishing the goals set out in the Potsdam Declaration. 
PRAISE FOR AMERICAN DEFENSE COUNSEL 
The defendants and other contemporaries often praised the American defense 
lawyers for their hard work on behalf of their Japanese clients. One contemporary stated 
that the behavior of the American defense lawyers demonstrated, "how seriously defense 
counsel took their duties, and how intensely they represented the interests of their former 
enemies." Rear Admiral John D. Murphy stated that "these American defense counsel 
ably [sic] carried out their defense duties with initiative, courage and devotion to their 
professional obligation to exert every legal effort in behalf of the accused."52 Spurlock 
stated that the Japanese defendants at first did not trust the American defense lawyers and 
expected only a token defense. However, by March 1946, "the opposite was true. Word 
had got around that the American advisory defense counsel were performing their task 
conscientiously and were effectively presenting the position of the accused to the War 
Crimes Commission." Spurlock went on to describe how the accused often sent letters of 
gratitude to their counsel, or sent family members to the War Crimes Commission to pay 
their respects, no matter the verdict One former Japanese major stated in his letter that 
he intended to serve his term and upon completion of his sentence would be like other 
Japanese who would "spend the rest of their lives teaching Japanese children the true 
meaning of democratic justice as it was known under the Stars and Stripes."53 
Other letters expressed gratitude for commuted sentences. Suehara Kitamura, 
originally sentenced to death, sent thanks to his defense counsel, Mr. Glasser on 6 
January 1950. Apologizing for the delay in sending the letter due to lack of a proper 
address, Kitamura expressed his "sincerest gratitude for your cordial and endeadorous 
[sic] effort in obtaining the commutation of my sentence, imposed upon me as a result of 
my trial."54 Kitamura seemed very sincere in his thanks, further stating: 
52 Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 91-92. 
53 Spurlock, "The Yokohama War Crimes Trials," 436. 
,54 Suehara Kitamura to Mr. Glasser, 6 January 1950. Harvard Law Library. 
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Very happy that I can express my gratitude for your kindness you have shown to 
me during the whole period of my session and subsequently for obtaining the 
commutation of my sentence. Unless you did not exert your effort in saving my life, I 
might have already been executed. Therefore I, at this very moment am trying to express 
my heartiest and sincerest appreciation for what you have respectably done on my behalf, 
saving my life.. .1 owe you very much. I will remember your supreme and honorable 
conduct throughout my life.55 
Kitamura concluded his letter by assuring Mr. Glasser that he was fulfilling his sentence 
faithfully, and believed he would eventually be freed and reunited with his family. 
The praise for the American defense counsel, especially from the suspects 
indicated that those involved did take seriously their role concerning the Class BC 
criminals, even though they were considered "small fry" compared to the Tokyo 
defendants. The defendants did not express a sense of "victim's justice," a charge lodged 
against the IMTFE, especially with respect to the inclusion of a judge from the 
Philippines. It is possible that everyone who expressed their thanks toward their defense 
counsel was not as sincere as Kitamura appeared. Some prisoners may have hoped for 
special treatment, early release, or to prove their reform to American captors. The letters 
indicated the defendants recognized the trial provided an opportunity to defend 
themselves, a chance that was often denied to Allied POWs. The trials also allowed the 
hundreds of Japanese defendants the chance to observe western justice and democracy in 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the goals of the IMTFE may have been to demonstrate democratic 
principles to the Japanese, but the lesser BC trials actually provided the better example, 
since they followed more rigorous judicial standards. The stricter regulations in the 
55 Kitamura to Mr. Glasser, 6 January 1950. 
91 
December 1945 memo better demonstrated western trial proceedings than the IMTFE, 
and the review process protected defendants from trial error. Class BC suspects were 
exposed to American models of democracy for an extended period, as the Class BC trials 
occurred over a longer time period than the Tokyo Trial. The Class BC prisoners proved, 
in their campaigns for release, that they had learned and adopted democratic principles. 
Though the period allotted for war crimes trials ended before all suspects were tried, the 
Eighth Army at Yokohama remained focused on its goal of providing fair trials, adhering 
to rigorous policies both during and after the Class BC trials. The United States' efforts 
to avoid bias in the trials helped to deflect the criticisms that surrounded the Tokyo Trial. 
Ultimately, the Class BC Trials served as a vehicle for the United States to model western 
style justice and democracy and demonstrate leniency and superiority to prove the 
strength of the United States not only to the country it occupied, but also to its Allies and 
the Soviet Union. This demonstration of power was critical given the tense global 
political scene, and the United States continued to use the Class BC trials to showcase its 
strength by ending the trials and pushing for a peace treaty. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ROLE OF THE CLASS BC TRIALS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 
As tensions mounted between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, the United States decided to end the war crimes trials in the 
Pacific. With the end of the Occupation looming in 1951, the United States was eager to 
finish the war crimes trials and sign a peace agreement with Japan. In order to ensure 
that Japan sided with the United States against the Soviet Union, the United States sought 
to end the Class BC war crimes trials before the peace treaty was signed as a sign of good 
faith and to demonstrate that the United States had put the events of the war behind it and 
was focused on the future. Ending the trials also meant that Japan's debt had been 
assessed and its people had paid for war time atrocities and could focus on the future. 
The United States and Japan signed the peace treaty in 1951, and Japan regained 
its sovereignty and became the stable ally in East Asia that the United States hoped for. 
The attitude of the United States towards Japan changed rapidly after the end of the war. 
In September 1945, MacArthur stated, "Japan will never again become a world power." 
He also reported that the Allies would not provide Japan with any supplies or relief 
during the winter, and that the Potsdam Declaration terms (including the war crimes 
trials) would be "enforced to the letter."1 He predicted an Occupation that would take 
"many years." One year later, he described Japan as caught in an ideological conflict, a 
country that could be "either a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous springboard 
for war." By March 1947, MacArthur began discussing peace treaty options claiming 
1 Hugh Baillie, "M' Arthur Declares Japan Ended As A Great Power; Orders Doihara Arrested," New York 
Times, September 22,1945. 
2 "M'Arthur Worried By Tokyo Dilemma," New York Times, September 2, 1946. 
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that the framework for democracy had been established in Japan.3 In August 1947, 
Mac Arthur returned control to the Tokyo government and assumed a role of "protection 
and friendly guidance rather than to continue to enact the role of an occupying army."4 
This development was essentially a "peace without a peace treaty." Concerns arose that 
the policy might anger Pacific allies including China and Korea. However, since those 
nations did not contribute money or manpower to the Occupation, the United States made 
the final policy decisions.5 On 2 March 1949, MacArthur pledged to defend Japan in 
case of attack, and described Japan as the "Switzerland" of the Pacific.6 He continued to 
push for a peace treaty throughout 1949, arguing that the Occupation goals had been 
achieved in 1947. MacArthur's attitude towards Japan highlighted the rapidly rising 
tensions between the United States and Soviet Union. The United States' willingness to 
alienate its Allies during the Occupation also suggests confidence on its part and the 
importance of East Asia in the fight against Communism. 
The issue of the peace treaty also created tensions within the United States, 
particularly between the State Department and the Department of Defense. At a meeting 
on 24 April 1950, the State Department argued that a peace treaty was essential, while the 
Department of Defense countered that a peace agreement could provoke the USSR.7 In 
his memoirs, policy advisor and later Ambassador to the Soviet Union George F. Kennan 
stated that he believed the USSR orchestrated the attack on Korea due to the discussion 
of a peace treaty between Japan and the United States. This statement appears to support 
3 "Transcript Of General MacArthur's Talk To The Press On Occupation," New York Times, March 18, 
1947. 
4 Lindesay Parrott, "Occupation Goal In Japan Held Won," New York Times, August 7, 1949. 
5 Parrott, "Occupation Goal In Japan Held Won," New York Times, August 7, 1949. 
6 "M'Arthur Pledges Defense Of Japan," New York Times, March 2, 1949. 
7 Richard B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992), 251. 
the Department of Defense's stance on the peace treaty, but as Richard B. Finn points out 
Q 
in Winners in Peace the timing poses a problem. While some, like MacArthur, pushed 
for a peace treaty, in June 1950 the United States had not made a definite decision. The 
outbreak of the Korean War changed the situation and led MacArthur to order the limited 
rearmament of Japan. Due to their distrust of Japan, the United States' Pacific Allies 
including Australia were opposed to rearmament. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida had 
also opposed Japan's rearmament in favor of economic recovery. John Foster Dulles, the 
principal negotiator for the peace treaty, hoped the Korean War would make the Japanese 
aware of their responsibilities as a nation of the free world.9 MacArthur expressed a 
similar viewpoint in December 1950, when he stated that it was Japan's duty to "join the 
free nations and mount force to repel force." He believed that after the treaty Japan 
would "exercise a profound influence upon the course of destiny in Asia."10 The Korean 
War helped persuade Japan to rearm and also highlighted the United States' need for a 
stable ally in East Asia. While tensions remained between the Allies in the Pacific, it 
helped to convince some Allies that a peace treaty was needed. Perhaps most importantly 
it was a clear example of the threat posed by Communism. 
In a letter to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida on 20 August 1951, only a few 
weeks before the treaty was signed, MacArthur wrote "Japan will reassume a position of 
dignity and equality within the family of nations and take a firm and invincible stand with 
the free world to repel those evil forces of international Communist tyranny which seek 
covertly or by force of arms to destroy freedom."11 His comments, a far cry from those 
8 Finn, Winners in Peace, 241. 
9 Finn, Winners in Peace, 270. 
10 "MacArthur Says Red Threat May Force Japan to Rearm," New York Times, December 31, 1950. 
11 "Key Japanese Role Seen By M'Arthur," New York Times, August 24, 1951. 
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made just after the war, reflected Mac Arthur's change in opinion regarding Japan and 
demonstrated the shift in the United States' focus to the containment of Communism. 
The United States pursued Japan as an ally in the fight against communism. Ending the 
war crimes trials was crucial to closing the chapter of the war and proceeding to address 
United States' concerns in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
THE END OF THE TRIALS AND THE SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY 
By January 1949, the United States began to take steps to end the war crimes 
trials. A message to the Commander in Chief, Far East dated 29 January 1949 ordered 
that no more Class A trials take place, and if possible investigations for Class BC trials be 
completed by 31 March 1949, with trials concluding before 30 September 1949.12 At 
Yokohama, the trials ended in October 1949. 
Peace with Japan and the end of the Occupation presented challenges to the 
United States. The United States strove for "maximum and exclusive control over 
potentially dangerous allies," primarily the Soviet Union.13 The United States recognized 
that Japan was the only country in East Asia that had the potential to gain great power 
status. The United States had no allies in East Asia during or immediately after World 
War II and, therefore, sought to "win Japan" as an ally against Communism.14 At the 
same time, the United States wanted to refrain from any agreements that would require its 
involvement in unwanted wars in the region. In order to avoid wartime obligations, the 
United States opted to create a bilateral alliance with Japan that would ultimately allow it 
12 Commander in Chief, Far East from DA, January 29, 1949. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, 
VA, Record Group 9, Box 160, Folder War Crimes 221-320. 
13 Victor D. Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia," International Security, 34, 
No. 3, Winter 2009/2010, 158. 
14 Cha, "Powerplay," 159-160. 
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to "rebuild the country on an anticommunist bulwark." George Kennan described Japan 
as "the key to Asia, just as Germany was the key to Europe."15 The peace treaty then was 
an important component of American strategy in the post war world. 
The peace treaty signed in San Francisco on 8 September 1951 by forty eight 
countries demonstrated unity among the Allied nations. It also ensured Japan's 
adherence to anti-communism, a stance the United States had worked to cultivate since 
the end of the war. Japan renounced all claims to former territories including Korea and 
Formosa, and agreed to enter into negotiations with Allied nations on various topics such 
as fishing rights, commercial interests, and reparations.16 In return, Japan received full 
sovereignty, and the American occupation ended. 
The treaty however placed Japan in a difficult position within East Asia and 
showed the United States as a country driven to contain Communism without much 
regard for its Allies and their concerns. Among the forty eight signatories to the treaty, 
the Soviet Union and China were absent. Therefore, Japan remained, technically, in a 
state of war against those two countries.17 Japanese rearmament brought complaints from 
US Allies including Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. American assistance to 
Japan led those countries to complain that the United States treated its former enemy 
better than its old, steadfast friends.18 Even the principal ally of the United States, Great 
Britain, disagreed with aspects of the treaty. John Foster Dulles did not invite the 
Chinese Nationalists to the peace conference. The United States ignored Britain's 
15 Cha, "Powerplay," 181-182. 
16 "Digest of Treaty to End Pacific War," New York Times, September 6, 1951. 
17 Miriam S. Farley, "Japan and US: Post-Treaty Problems," Far Eastern Survey, XXI, No. 4, February 27, 
1952. 
18 Farley, "Japan and US: Post-Treaty Problem," 34. 
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opposition to this, straining Anglo-American relations to secure an agreement that would 
"almost inevitably lead Japan to align herself with the United States."19 
Even with the objections of close Allies, the Communist threat, and possibility of 
a renewed war between Japan and the Soviet Union, the United States still signed the 
peace treaty. This created a co-dependent situation in East Asia. Japan needed protection 
and support from the United States, especially while rearming itself, and the United 
States needed the cooperation of Japan to face the Communist threat in the region.20 It is 
interesting though, that the United States sought to sign a treaty and end the Occupation 
when Japan was still in a weakened position, especially in the face of the objections of its 
Allies. Fear of a prolonged Occupation may have played a role in the decision to sign the 
treaty. MacArthur warned that a prolonged Occupation would prevent genuine 
reconciliation with Japan.21 While the Japanese cooperated with Occupation forces, the 
potential for rebellion existed. Exasperation with continued orders from Americans could 
have allowed anti-American influences, proliferated by the Communists, to spread. The 
United States perhaps thought it best to proceed with the peace treaty rather than risk the 
Soviet Union gaining a foothold in Japan by provoking anti-American feelings. It was 
also best not to excite any anti-American feelings in Japan while the Korean War was 
being fought, since Japanese Communists hoped that their position in Japan would be 
strengthened by a North Korean victory. Yoshida and Emperor Hirohito expressed their 
confidence in an American victory in the conflict. Perhaps hoping for a quick peace 
19 Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent: 
Kent State University Press, 1989), 277-278. 
20 Farley, "Japan and US: Post-Treaty Problem," 38. 
21 G. F. Hudson, "Anglo-Japanese Relations Since the Peace Treaty," World Affairs, 116, No. 2, Summer 
1953,47. 
22 Farley, "Japan and US: Post-Treaty Problem," 34. 
23 Finn, Winners in Peace, 262-263. 
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treaty by proving Japan to be a cooperative partner in the fight against Communism, 
Yoshida agreed to limited rearmament of Japan. 
The attitude of the United States in signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
reflected the continuation of the pragmatic, goal oriented policy toward Japan. Since the 
end of the war, during the Occupation, and during the war crimes trials, the United States 
strove to obtain an ally in East Asia. Although the peace treaty created potential for 
problems down the road, it was signed to secure Japan's friendship and create 
dependency on the United States and was touted as a "great demonstration of Allied 
unity."24 The Soviet Union and Communist China's objections to the treaty were 
ignored, and the United States pursued its own path. The treaty demonstrated that the 
United States' ambitions during the Occupation process had come to fruition, and with 
Japan as an ally the United States could focus on containing Communism in the region. 
PROTESTS AGAINST THE EARLY RELEASE OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS 
Prior to the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, on 7 March 1950, 
MacArthur established a parole board in Tokyo, granting it authorization to reduce the 
prison sentences of Japanese war criminals. A memo to MacArthur described the Board 
of Parole as an opportunity for convicted Japanese war criminals to demonstrate that they 
had served "well and orderly their sentences in prison and rehabilitate themselves 
physically, morally, economically, and socially, thus enabling them to return to, and 
become again worthy members of human society," which was "in full accord with the 
24 John M. Allison, "The Japanese Peace Treaty and Related Security Pacts," Proceedings of the American 
Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting (1921-1969), 46, April24-26, 1952, 35. 
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principles of modern penology."25 As in the Class BC trials, the process of parole for 
each prisoner followed a system that allowed for fair treatment and the possibility of 
parole for each prisoner. Circular No. 5 established the uniform system for Japanese war 
criminals and established policies for awarding confinement credit, good time credit, and 
parole. Confinement credit deducted any time served as a suspect or a prisoner from a 
prisoner's sentence. Good time credit, which was not applicable to those sentenced to 
life imprisonment, allowed those who "faithfully observed all of the rules and regulations 
at the place or places in which he is or has been confined and has not been subjected to 
disciplinary punishment" to receive a reduction in his sentence. The longer a prisoner's 
sentence, the more days he was eligible to receive per month for good behavior. Those 
sentenced for six months to one year could receive five days each month for good 
behavior, while those sentenced to ten years or more were eligible to receive ten days a 
month off their sentence. It was also possible to restore good time credit to a prisoner's 
sentence if he violated prison rules. War criminals who observed all the rules and 
regulations became eligible for parole. The board considered several factors when 
verifying the eligibility of prisoners for parole, including the record and facts of the trial, 
the behavior, attitude, and work record of the prisoner, age, physical and mental 
condition, as well as the financial status of his family. The Circular described other issues 
relating to the release of war criminals, such as actions allowed by the Board, supervision 
of parolees, and the revocation of parole. 
Allowing the early release of war criminals continued to promote the sense of the 
United States' goodwill towards the Japanese. MacArthur's decision to create a parole 
25 SCAP from DA, July 19, 1950. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, RG 9, Folder DA WX 
July 1950. 
26 Trials of B and C Class Japanese War Criminals, Tokio [sic], 238-243. 
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board however led to a backlash from the Soviet Union, which claimed MacArthur had 
violated the charter of the IMTFE as well as the Far East Commission directive of 3 April 
1946 that required consultation among members of the FEC prior to issuing directives. 
The United States countered that MacArthur, as SCAP, was the "sole executive authority 
for the Allied Powers in Japan" and had "the responsibility for the various matters 
pertaining to the execution of the sentences of the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East, including the granting of parole to war criminals tried by that court." Since the 
Soviet Union was involved in the IMTFE, its anger focused on the release of Class A 
prisoners, namely Shigemitsu, Hiranuma, and Araki. The United States government 
stated that MacArthur's actions conformed to the agreements cited by the Soviet Union, 
and were "in accord with enlightened practice in various countries with respect to the 
treatment of convicted criminals."27 Granting early release of convicted criminals of 
Class A and Class BC crimes was simply another way to demonstrate the "enlightened" 
practices of democratic countries. It also placed the United States in a favorable light 
compared to the Soviet Union, which sought to keep remaining prisoners in custody. 
The United States postponed sending a formal reply to the Soviet Union regarding 
the early release complaint for several weeks. In their response in early June of 1950, the 
United States reiterated MacArthur's authority to parole Japanese war criminals and 
claimed the Soviet Union was "guilty of a fundamental error if it confused parole with a 
change in the sentence imposed by the military tribunal." The State Department went on 
to define parole for the Soviet Union as permission for a "convicted criminal to serve part 
of his sentence outside of prison under certain conditions and controls subject to being 
returned to prison for serving the remainder of the sentence if the conditions of parole are 
27 Walter H. Waggoner, "Russians Protest Japanese Paroles," New York Times, May 13,1950. 
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violated." The United States government chastised the Soviet Union for addressing their 
original communication to the United States and not to the FEC, since the questions it 
raised fell under the FEC's jurisdiction. 
The situation regarding Japanese war criminals' parole highlights the tension 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The early release of war criminals led 
the Soviet Union to accuse the United States of aggressive policies in Asia and an attempt 
to remilitarize Japan. An article appearing in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia described the 
policy of parole as reflecting "the whole aggressive character of American policy, in the 
East as well as the West, preparatory to unleashing a new war."29 The Soviet Union 
likely viewed the release of prisoners as part of the United States' process of 
remilitarization and therefore a threat toward Communism in East Asia. This accusation 
did not deter the United States from its plan for the early release of convicted war 
criminals, and by 1958 the last war criminals were released. The strong-willed US 
response demonstrated American power to the Soviet Union and to Japan as well, which 
would realize it was aligning with the superior ally. 
The last criminals to be released were ten Class A prisoners: Araki, Hata, 
Hoshino, Kaya, Kido, Oka, Oshima, Sato, Shimada, and Suzuki. These ten, who had 
received life sentences from the IMTFE, were set free after Premier Nobusuke Kishi 
visited Washington in 1957 and requested clemency. Following the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty's stipulation that clemency could only be granted after consulting the majority of 
the governments involved in the IMTFE, the United States discussed the request with 
Great Britain, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, 
28 "U.S. Chides Soviet On Parole In Japan," New York Times, June 9, 1950. 
29 "Remilitarization Charged," New York Times, June 9, 1950, 
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and Pakistan. Since the Soviet Union, China, and India did not sign the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, they were not consulted. The various governments agreed to the request, 
and Japanese war criminals' parole was effected.30 For the Class BC prisoners, tried by 
US military commissions, only US approval was needed. 
DEMONSTRATIONS OF WESTERN STYLE JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY 
With trial procedures clearly detailed, the military commissions were in a position 
to demonstrate the Western justice system and the principles of democracy for the 
Japanese. Modeling these ideas was a main goal of the Occupation and the trials 
provided the perfect vehicle. However, the Americans stationed at Sugamo Prison also 
demonstrated principles they hoped the Japanese would adopt. Yoshio Kodama, a Class 
A suspect held at Sugamo Prison, who was released without trial, describes the American 
GI's stationed at Sugamo in a positive manner. American soldiers displayed courtesy and 
consideration towards the Japanese prisoners, the opposite of what Kodama expected. 
Kodama described a situation in which he had to carry a heavy load. He stated Japanese 
prison guards would have yelled at him for having difficulty, but the American guards 
found people to assist Kodama in his task.31 The prisoners were also allowed to observe 
traditional Japanese holidays and informed of major events occurring within their 
families. In Kodama's case, he was informed of the birth of his daughter, and was even 
given assistance in choosing her name, something he says would not have occurred in a 
Japanese run prison.32 
30 "10 War Criminals Get Full Freedom," New York Times, April 8, 1958. 
31 Kodama, Sugamo Diary, 2. 
32 Kodama, Sugamo Diary, 40, 88. 
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At one point during the summer, Kodama took a bucket of water to the exercise 
yard to try to settle the dust and create a more pleasant atmosphere. An American MP, 
noticing his actions, said it was not fair for one person to take on the task, and suggested 
a rotation system. Kodama thought that the attitude of the MP reflected a "real sense of 
democracy" and the fact that a common soldier possessed such a sense of justice should 
be a lesson to everyone.33 Kodama also described American interrogators as polite and 
sticking to questions of fact, even when an interrogation lasted for several hours.34 
Kodama's description shows that Japanese prisoners noted the actions and attitudes of 
their American captors. At the same time, including statements in his diary praising 
American soldiers was most likely beneficial to Kodama. Such statements demonstrated 
a respect for the occupying authorities. They also promoted the sense of Kodama's 
rehabilitation and desire to learn the democratic ways of the United States, a good 
attitude to adopt during the Occupation. Kodama's diary did not always praise the 
United States so highly, but these comments were nonetheless self-serving to some 
extent. 
Kodama said that Class C prisoners did not necessarily receive the same polite 
interrogations as Class A suspects. A Class C suspect described a prosecutor making 
threatening gestures, something Kodama and the other Class A suspects did not 
experience. The Americans though, according to Kodama, conducted more humane trials 
i f  
than the British and allowed suspects to have their say in a formal trial. His opinion 
though, must be carefully scrutinized. Since the United States was in charge of the 
Occupation and held the greatest power, it was in Kodama's best interest to support the 
33 Kodama, Sugamo Diary, 117. 
34 Kodama, Sugamo Diary, 107. 
35 Kodama, Sugamo Diary, 128-129. 
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Americans, especially once they began releasing Class A suspects without trial. Critics 
argued the British trials were too harsh and decried the treatment and sentencing of 
suspects. Public protests were held against the British military commissions for 
sentencing suspects to death in cases where they accused had not been proven guilty of 
murder. Piccigallo however, states that the British war crimes trials were "conducted 
with admirable seriousness and care" and the British legal officers "performed admirably, 
evincing a generally high standard of competence and dedication."36 Kodama relied on 
talk amongst the prisoners to make his claim concerning British brutality. He had no 
interactions with the British would not have felt the need to speak so positively about 
them as he did about the Americans. 
The war crimes suspects of all three classes had many opportunities at Sugamo to 
mingle and share their opinions. Kodama's diary offers insight into the attitudes of 
suspects about the Class C trials. Many prisoners seemed to think the trials were an 
empty formality, although Kodama believed this attitude was due to the fact that many 
suspects claimed to be innocent. Another Class C suspect, however, said the trials were 
fair, and the men deserved their sentences. An acquitted Class C suspect also believed 
that most people deserved their accusations, and also described the trials as fair and the 
investigations as thorough.37 Sandra Wilson, one of the few scholars who examines the 
Class BC criminals, describes the writings of the BC prisoners wherein they make claims 
of unfair treatment. One prisoner, "Sergeant Akagi" stated that BC prisoners were given 
less food than other prisoners. Another memoir written by a Class A prisoner, Ryoichi 
36 Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 115-116. 
37 Kodama, Sugamo Diary, 59-60, 64, 137. 
38 Sandra Wilson, "War, Soldier, and Nation in 1950s Japan," International Journal of Asian Studies, 5 no. 
2 (2008): 200. 
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Sasakawa described the food shortage as a result of the unfair distribution of food by the 
prisoners themselves, as well as the greedy appetites of the "senior prisoners." Like 
Kodama's memoir, Sasakawa's must be carefully scrutinized, although for different 
reasons. Unlike Kodama, Sasakawa hoped to be imprisoned and appeared to be on a self 
prescribed mission to "explain without hesitation that Japan did not wage a war of 
aggression." Sasakawa believed that he alone had "the confidence to convince the people 
of the world."40 He did however, offer some insight to the Class BC prisoners. 
Sasakawa described the POW prisoners as afraid of interrogations, because they were 
nervous "that their criminal deeds would come to light."41 His opinion of the trials was 
often negative and he believed the United States sought revenge through the trials. His 
self-righteous diary offered a great deal of advice to the United States on how to handle 
the trials, the Occupation in general, and reasons for fighting Communism. 
Kodama did not believe the war crimes trials necessarily benefitted the United 
States, and his opinion of the trials evolves throughout his diary. He presents an overall 
picture of life in Sugamo and an admiration for the attitudes and actions of the American 
soldiers. He also makes it clear that American GI's were committed to modeling 
appropriate behaviors for the Japanese prisoners and those behaviors were noticed by the 
war crimes suspects. Some of the Class BC prisoners at Sugamo displayed democratic 
behaviors themselves, hoping to prove that some Japanese were adopting democratic 
attitudes and principles. 
The writings by BC prisoners Wilson studied, as well as the memoirs by Kodama 
and Sasakawa offer a mixed assessment of life in Sugamo Prison. Unfair situations 
39 Sasakawa, Sugamo Diary, 80-82. 
40 Sasakawa, Sugamo Diary, 80. 
41 Sasakawa, Sugamo Diary, 45. 
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described by some prisoners existed alongside the democratic or sympathetic situations 
Kodama described. Some suspects were wrongly accused and held in prison, while 
others had committed crimes and had reason to fear the interrogations Sasakawa 
described. The writings were most likely geared towards creating sympathy for the 
author, especially those articles penned by Class BC prisoners who wished to make clear 
that they were just following orders and were therefore not guilty of committing war 
crimes. Memoirs by Class A prisoners such as Kodama and Sasakawa have been 
translated into English, and these works tend to reflect more positively on the United 
States. Diaries of Class BC prisoners, such as those used by Wilson have not been 
translated. The works available to English audiences indicate within Sugamo Prison 
various attitudes were exhibited, but overall, the Americans modeled democratic 
principles. 
CLASS BC PRISONERS DEMONSTRATE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES 
Since the Class BC trials spanned a longer time frame than the Class A trial those 
prisoners were exposed to American Occupation officials longer than the Class A 
suspects. There were far more Class BC detainees than Class A detainees, which resulted 
in a higher number of BC prisoners who learned and practiced, at least to some extent, 
the democratic principles the United States had hoped to inculcate. 
Although the San Francisco Peace Treaty restored Japan's sovereignty, it included 
a clause concerning condemned war criminals. Article 11 stated that the sentences of 
convicted Class BC war criminals could only be commuted by (or with the consent of) 
the prosecuting country. The article was surprising, since the Americans began a parole 
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system in 1950 to release prisoners. In 1952, China released its prisoners in Sugamo 
under general amnesty. Since many war criminals had been released, further clemency 
was expected, and Article 11 withheld the right to grant clemency from the Japanese 
government. This did not deter the imprisoned war criminals, as they petitioned the 
Japanese government "to take up their cause, insisting that the government should cease 
to subordinate itself to the victors in the Second World War."42 The prisoners' call to 
remove Japan from what they viewed as a position of subordination to the United States 
suggests that some Japanese were not happy with the situation in which they found 
themselves and wished the government would adopt a stronger role in the post war world. 
While the Class BC prisoners may not have agreed with the relationship between Japan 
and the United States after they signed the treaty, the prisoners used American values 
such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press to accomplish their goal of 
encouraging the government to distance itself from the United States. 
The Japanese government did not object to Article 11 of the peace treaty which 
caused extensive prisoner frustration at the time the peace treaty was signed. In March 
1952, the prisoners formed a committee to lobby for their release and create public 
sympathy. The general public appeared to support the inmates, as millions of Japanese 
citizens signed a petition for their release, and many people, including high profile 
entertainers and politicians visited the prison to show their support. Visits by politicians 
showed that the government changed its stance. Prisoners were able to meet with the 
politicians, including cabinet ministers and the Chief Justice of the Foreign Ministry, to 
make their cases heard. These meetings allowed the prisoners to be directly involved in 
politics and fight for release, but it also demonstrated that the Japanese government was 
42 Wilson, "Prisoners in Sugamo and their Campaign for Release," 172. 
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invested in the issue.43 This was a development the United States needed to consider. As 
early as August 1952, an article published in the Japanese Bar Association journal 
warned that the continued retention of convicted war criminals would endanger the 
treaty. It also warned that retention could turn the inmates into heroes, since public 
opinion was moving in favor of the prisoners' release. If the prisoners were turned into 
heroes, then the Japanese could become hostile to the United States, which would only 
help the communist cause.44 The United States, wishing to avoid such a situation, 
continued with the early release of convicted war criminals. 
The involvement of the convicted men in public politics, and their campaign for 
release was an early demonstration that democratic principles were understood and 
employed among the Japanese to further their own cause. Public opinion regarding 
Japanese war criminals began to shift in the early 1950s as the population began to see 
the Class BC prisoners as soldiers who were caught in circumstances beyond their 
control. Those Class BC prisoners held at Sugamo used the changing opinion to their 
advantage. Capitalizing on their freedom of speech, they wrote letters and articles to the 
press, to gain sympathy or clemency. 
The outbreak of the Korean War caused a shortage of American soldiers, and the 
American Occupation government began to turn control of Sugamo Prison over to the 
Japanese in August of 1950. American officers supervised the Japanese wardens. 
Captain Lonnie Adams gave the prisoners two options: they could govern themselves, or 
they would have to remain locked up due to the shortage. The prisoners elected to 
govern themselves, which they accomplished with no major disciplinary problems. As 
43 Wilson, "Prisoners in Sugamo and their Campaign for Release," 178-181, 184. 
44 Wilson, "Prisoners in Sugamo and their Campaign for Release," 179. 
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the Korean War continued, American personnel were phased out of Sugamo and replaced 
by Japanese personnel. With the signing of the peace treaty in 1951, control of Sugamo 
was turned over completely to the Japanese.45 
With the American establishment of the parole system in 1950, the changing 
public opinion regarding war criminals, and the turn Sugamo to Japanese management, 
the Class BC prisoners began to press their government for release. In addition to the 
letters, articles, and prisoner testimony, the inmates published their own newspapers. 
One newspaper in particular, Sugamo, published from November 1952 to March 1953, 
concerned itself with early release. Soon after the peace treaty was signed, many 
organizations began to campaign on the behalf of or in support of the inmates, and 
Sugamo focused on these activities as well as the peace treaty.46 Various women's 
organizations offered tea ceremony classes to the prisoners, university professors 
delivered lectures, and tourist groups actually visited Sugamo after the Japanese took 
control. Businesses also supported the prisoners with donations, which included two 
television sets 47 Sugamo reported on these activities, in addition to the activities of the 
prison committee arguing for early release.48 Growing public sympathy for imprisoned 
war criminals was clearly demonstrated by these businesses and organizations. Releasing 
prisoners demonstrated the United States was attuned to the public opinion of its new ally 
and willing to cooperate in matters that were important to Japanese people. These actions 
also showed the Japanese that the United States was a cooperative ally, although both 
45 Wilson, "Prisoners in Sugamo and their Campaign for Release," 174-175 and Ginn, Sugamo Prison, 10-
11. 
46 Wilson, "Prisoners in Sugamo and their Campaign for Release," 176-177. 
47 Wilson, "Prisoners in Sugamo and their Campaign for Release," 179-180. 
48 Wilson, "Prisoners in Sugamo and their Campaign for Release," 176-177. 
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countries realized the importance of their alliance and likely would have ignored small 
areas of disagreement such as the release of convicted war criminals. 
The inmates at Sugamo used their freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and 
their connections to politicians and government leaders to push for their release. They 
encouraged the Japanese government to act as a sovereign nation and take control of the 
war criminal situation, garnering public support for their cause along the way. The 
actions of these prisoners, and the show of public support, especially concerning the 
widespread petition for their release showed that the United States accomplished its goal 
of establishing American values such as the freedom of speech and support for 
fundamental human rights as stated in the Potsdam Declaration.49 The last war criminal 
was released in 1958. 
CONCLUSION 
While the Class BC trials of the "small fry" were not considered as important as 
the Class A trial, the United States did use the lesser trials to its advantage. Ending the 
trials demonstrated goodwill towards the Japanese. The early release of convicted war 
criminals, over the protests of the Soviet Union, demonstrated leniency and strength. 
Even though the Class BC trials did not occupy the limelight, they still proved useful to 
the United States in its single-minded pursuit to contain Communism in East Asia. 
The Class BC prisoners demonstrated that the United States had in fact instilled 
an appreciation for democratic principles in the Japanese. It is difficult to determine to 
what degree western principles were imbibed among the population so soon after the end 
of the Occupation, but the early release campaign suggested that western ideas such as 
49 Potsdam Declaration, Article 10. 
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the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press were adopted, at least on some level, 
by the Japanese. The prisoners' use of their rights and the signing of the peace treaty 
demonstrated the United States' success in Japan after the war. The Class BC trials were 
only one of the United States' tactics. However, these often-ignored trials accomplished 
more than the Tokyo Trial, and were used in the global political arena to prove to Japan 
that wartime atrocities were in the past and that, with the signing of the peace treaty, 
Japan could look towards a democratic future with powerful new allies. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The Pacific war crimes trials led the Allies into unprecedented situations. The 
trials marked the first time high ranking officials were removed from their posts, and the 
first time they were tried for aggressive warfare and crimes against humanity. The 
United States entered into the Pacific trials intending to punish those who committed 
atrocities during the war. Instead, rising Cold War tensions overshadowed the trials and 
in the case of the Tokyo Trial, took focus away from that goal. The Tokyo Trial became 
less important to the United States as it became more focused on its own agenda, 
demonstrating its strength to the Soviet Union and pursuing Japan as an ally against 
Communism in East Asia. 
According to Pritchard, in addition to the primary goal of identifying and 
punishing major war criminals, the Tokyo Trial had a secondary goal to morally 
reconstruct the Japanese people, and the world in general.1 Until the Tokyo Trial, much 
of the Japanese public was unaware of the actions of their government and military 
during the war. The education of the public on the events in the years prior to and during 
the war was the greatest accomplishment of the Tokyo Trial. Due to the immense trial 
record which detailed Japan's role in the war for the population, the United States and its 
Allies could take "reasonable satisfaction" from the education the trial provided for the 
'j 
public. Given the clemency offered to General Ishii and the refusal to try Emperor 
Hirohito, the United States cannot be said to have successfully accomplished the primary 
goal to punish Japan's major war criminals. 
1 Pritchard, "An Overview of the Historical Importance of the Tokyo Trial," 3. 
2 Robert A. Fearey, The Occupation of Japan: Second Phase: 1948-1950 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 
1972), 20. 
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Michael Bess offers a positive perspective on the Tokyo Trial. Though at the 
time, setting precedents for international law and future international tribunals was not 
necessarily an explicit goal of the Tokyo Trial, those involved were aware of the potential 
impact of their actions. Bess states: 
The trials need to be understood not just as the concluding acts of World War II, 
but as the catalysts of a revolutionary shift in the defense of basic human rights. Bringing 
men like Goring and Tojo to justice was vitally important, but more important still was 
the laying of legal and institutional foundations for dealing with the crimes of future 
Gorings and Tojos who might arise in later generations. Herein lies the trials' real 
historical (and moral) legacy: they constituted a qualitative leap toward a truly global 
system of justice.3 
The Tokyo Trial was part of a process that included the creation of the United Nations 
and development of new international treaties such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights that sought to protect humanity against the horrors that occurred during 
World War II. 
Bess believes the Tokyo (and Nuremberg) Trials were not simply show trials. He 
sees them as contributions to international law, allowing for some positive legacy. The 
accomplishment of the Class BC trials at Yokohama was the punishment of war criminals 
who were personally responsible for committing atrocities. This opinion was voiced as 
early as 1950 in Robert A. Fearey's work on the Occupation of Japan from 1948 to 
1950.4 Without the publicity of the A trial, the military commissions at Yokohama could 
focus on delivering fair punishment for war crimes. 
While the members of the military commissions at Yokohama could be appointed 
by any Allied state, most commissions were composed of American members. The 
absence of other Allied countries, most notably the Soviet Union, removed tensions from 
3 Michael Bess, Choices Under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2006), 280. 
4 Fearey, The Occupation of Japan, 21. 
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the court room and allowed the commissions to concentrate on the trials before them, 
rather than on the assertion of their power in the post war world. 
There were many things to take into consideration after World War II. The war 
crimes trials, especially the BC trials, were only part of the rebuilding process in Japan. 
The BC trials in particular, while given little publicity, did play an important role in the 
end of the Occupation and subsequent peace treaty between Japan and the United States 
and other Allies. Since the Tokyo Trial was over by the time serious peace treaty 
considerations arose, it could not be used to further the interests of the United States. 
Class BC trials were still in session however, and by ending the trials the United States 
could demonstrate good faith and a willingness to cooperate with its former enemy. 
Once the Yokohama trials ended, as an additional show of cooperation and perhaps in 
response to public opinion in Japan, the United States allowed for the early release of 
convicted war criminals. Perhaps because the Class BC trials were considered 
unimportant, the United States could use them as a concession to the Japanese without 
actually forfeiting anything of value. 
Wilson's recent research also suggests that the Class BC trials accomplished more 
in teaching the Japanese American democratic values. The issues surrounding the Tokyo 
Trial raised doubts about the legitimacy of the trial itself as well as courtroom procedure, 
reducing the credibility of claims about the democratic principles modeled for the 
Japanese. The BC criminals sentenced to prison terms used American ideals in their 
quest for early release from prison. 
There remains a great deal of research to be done on the Pacific war crimes trials, 
particularly the Class BC trials. Fearey stated the importance of the Class BC trials over 
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the Tokyo Trial in 1950, but shortly after his claim the Class BC trials were almost 
completely forgotten. Overshadowed by the drama of the Tokyo Trial, the records of the 
trials at Yokohama offer a look at how the United States worked quietly to rehabilitate 
Japan and model principles they hoped would take hold among the population. Though 
the Tokyo Trial was touted as the most important war crimes trial in Japan, it was more 
the showy end to World War II in the Pacific and a public spectacle that marked the end 
of Japan's militaristic era. The long ignored trials of the "small fry" were more 
successful and important in shaping the tense post war era. 
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